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I. INTRODUCTION
Come gather and sing to the Common Law whose leaf and seed we are,
Whether we live by the waggling jaw or counsel, miles from the Bar.
The wood is good and the sap is strong that gave us Coke and Hale,
Right is a battle to win from Wrong, in spite of contempt andjail.
It calls for brain and it calls for will, but an acorn knows his mission:
Law is the Oak ofLiberty still, in the Common Law Tradition.
Rowdy dowdy doodle-ee-o In the Common Law Tradition.
Rowdy dowdy doodle-ee-o In the Common Law Tradition.'
he common law, and how it develops rules for allocating risk
and deciding business and commercial disputes through a body
of reported public decisions, has provided a framework for
governing commercial trade and commerce that many countries have
I MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: How THE CRISIS IN THE
LEGAL PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY 177-78 (1994).
Professor Glendon writes that when she was a law student at the University of
Chicago in 1959, Professor Karl Llewellyn entered the classroom on the last day
of her Elements of the Law course and invited the students to join him in singing
this ballad he composed. See id.
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adopted today.2 Relatedly, four scholars from Harvard University and the
University of Chicago recently credited the common law as a reason why
certain countries develop at a more advanced rate than others3 The
common law, with its tradition of stability and predictability, is also often
cited as an important reason why companies are attracted to particular
2 See RAY AUGUST, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW 42 (2d ed. 1997)
(reproducing a map depicting the distribution of the world's legal systems).
3 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer of Harvard
University, and Robert Vishny of the University of Chicago, divided the legal
systems of the world into four categories based on histories:
" English common law relying on case precedents: Countries in this group
include Britain and its former colonies ranging from the United States,
Canada, Hong Kong, Singapore and Australia.
" Civil law relying on the classification of rules by legal scholars: This
category is broken down into three subcategories:
* French civil law nations: Countries in this group include France,
Indonesia, Spain and Mexico.
" German civil law nations: Countries in this group include Japan, South
Korea and Taiwan.
* Scandinavian law nations: This group is limited to the Scandinavian
nations.
These scholars reached a number of conclusions:
" Common law nations are the most:
1. Protective of shareholder rights.
2. Protective of creditor rights.
3. Enforcers of laws.
" French civil law nations are the least:
4. Protective of shareholder rights.
5. Protective of creditor rights.
6. Enforcers of laws.
* German civil law nations fall in between, but are very close to common
law nations in protecting creditor rights.
The Law of the Market, ECONOMIST, Apr. 19, 1997, at 78. See also RAFAEL LA
PORTA ET AL., LAW AND FINANCE (National Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 5661, 1996); RAFAEL LA PORTA ET AL., LEGAL DETERMINANTS OF
EXTERNAL FINANCE (National Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
5879, 1997). These scholars also found that stock markets in these countries reflect
these differences. Where protections are the greatest, markets are the strongest. In
particular, they state: "In the typical common-law country, the value of the
stockmarket is equal to around 60% of GNP. In civil-law countries, the authors
find, markets tend to be far smaller. French-[civil] law countries, for example, have
an average market capitalisation ratio of only 21% of GNP." The Law of the
Market, supra.
[VOL. 88
PRIVATIZATION OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
countries and states to conduct business.' Further, with respect to the area
of intellectual property:
[T]he common law has emerged as a source of protection for intellectual
property rights throughout this century whenever statutory protection for
new forms of media were still evolving. This phenomenon results from
the relationship between communicationtechnologies, which are dynamic
and often difficult to anticipate, and statutes, which traditionally have
been adopted only in reaction to such changes.... [I]n cases in which
statutory protection may not readily apply to new technologies, intellec-
tual property owners have repeatedly and successfully resorted to
common law theories for legal solutions to new problems.5
4 See ROBERT STEWART, BERMUDA: AN ECONOMY WHICH WORKS (1997)
(pointing out that one of the major reasons why international companies are
attracted to Bermuda is its. English common law system and the objective, public
decisions rendered by Judicial British Committee of the Privy Council-often
described as the Commonwealth's Supreme Court). Donald Conlon and Daniel
Sullivan note that a key reason why many companies incorporate in Delaware is
because of its:
[Two hundred] plus years of case law. In its breadth and depth, this body
of law goes further than similar bodies of law in other states toward meeting
corporate needs for certainty and predictability.... Organization theorists
have long recognized the importance of reducing uncertainty by controlling
or managing elements of the external environment, such as the legal
environment (citations omitted).
Donald E. Conlon & Daniel P. Sullivan;Examining the Actions of Organizations
in Conflict: Evidence from the Delaware Court of Chancery, ACAD. OF MGMT. J.,
June 1999, at 320.
s Bruce P. Keller, Condemned to Repeat the Past: The Reemergence of
Misappropriation and Other Common Law Theories ofProtectionforIntellectual
Property Rights, 11 HARv. J. L. & TECH. 401,403 (1998). Keller also notes:
Litigants in the online world have [also] resorted to a variety of common
law claims to address problems such as junk e-mail and hacking. Future
advances, even in such commonplace technologies as television, are equally
likely to result in the assertion of... common law theories.
This pattern at first seems odd, particularly considering that the
technological advancements that spawn new communicative endeavors also
create a strong desire to organize such endeavors within a comprehensive
legislative framework. On reflection, however, the immediate resort to
common law theories is understandable. Although it is true that the myriad
scenarios resulting from developing technologies spur proposed legislative
solutions, that process, in itself, poses two problems. First, it takes time to
1999-2000]
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In short, the common law's accomplishments with respect to trade and
commerce are impressive. Today, however, our courts and system for
developing commercial precedent are under attack, perhaps more than ever
before. Private alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") as a method for
resolving business disputes is "hot"-courts and traditional litigation are
not.6 Yet, in light of the common law's track record, it is more than ironic
that business and commercial dispute resolution is becoming more and
more privatized, thereby stunting the growth and development of the very
body of law that has traditionally served business so well.7
get legislation enacted. Second, even the most forward looking statute
cannot anticipate all technological controversies. As a result, statues have
way of lagging behind real life. This lag sometimes leaves litigants in a
bind, particularly owners of intellectual property rights who may believe
their rights have been violated in a manner not explicitly addressed by
statutory schemes. Common law, on the other hand, is more adaptable. A
court presented with a novel set of facts can review prior case law, analyze
new factual situations, and, reasoning from past precedent, apply existing
legal principles to fashion anew rule governing the heretofore unanticipated
set of facts facing the court. This was demonstrated repeatedly throughout
the twentieth century when new technologies, or new uses of existing
technologies, generated novel intellectual property disputes. When entities
that had invested heavily to create commercially valuable assets felt
threatened by those who tried to piggyback on the public's fascination with
a product or service not fully protected by intellectual property law, they
relied on common law theories ... to protect their interests.
Id. at 403-05. See also M. Stuart Madden, The Vital Common Law: Its Role in a
StatutoryAge, 18 U. ARK.LITTLEROCKL.J. 555 (1996) (describing thevitality and
adaptability of the common law).
6 See, e.g., Derek Bok, A Flawed System, HARV. MAG., May-June, 1983, at 38
(cited in Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1073 n. 2 (1984))
(decrying "the familiar tilt in the law curriculum toward preparing students for
legal combat," and exhorting law schools to train their students "for the gentler arts
of reconciliation and accommodation"); Warren E. Burger, Isn't There a Better
Way?, 68 A.BA. J. 274 (1982); Warren E. Burger, Agendafor 2000 A.D.-A Need
for Systematic Anticipation, 70 F.R.D. 83, 93-96 (1976); Carolyn Kleiner, The
Action Out of Court, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 29, 1999, at 91 (noting the
rise of law school ADR programs).
7 Professor John Fleming reminds us that the very nature of a vibrant and
healthy common law legal system involves conflict. He writes: "A great deal of
human activity.., involves conflict with opposing interests of others.... [O]ur
capitalist system, countenances if not actively encourages friction in which one
enterpriser advances himselfat the cost ofanotherfor the assumed good ofsociety
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The primary purpose of this Article is to revisit the role and importance
of the common law and our system of precedent, highlight how the
development of the contemporary body of commercial law is being
thwarted and distortedthroughvarious privatizationprocesses, discuss why
these privatization processes are shortsighted and erroneous, and most
importantly, suggest proposals for reform. Part II revisits the important role
that courts and the system of precedent play in the prevention and
resolution of business disputes. Part I addresses ways in which business
transactions and disputes have changed over the years and how courts have
sometimes struggled to service them. Part IV discusses how those changes
have resulted in businesses increasingly turning to private ADR-the first
level ofprivatization-to resolve disputes. Part V addresses a second form
of privatization: (1) managerial judging; (2) the bureaucratization of the
judiciary; (3) the attempt by courts to decrease their workload and conserve
judicial resources by diverting business cases into ADR; and finally, (4) the
increased use of vacatur, selective publication and the adoption of no-
citation rules, depublication, filings under seal and confidential settlements.
Part VI explores how these privatization processes have been (and continue
to be) furthered and accelerated by changes in the institutional practice of
law-namely, through the advent of the "discovery lawyer" at many
corporate law firms.
Standing alone, none of these developments maybe cause for concern.
However, as pointed out in Part VII, the cumulative effects of these
privatizationprocesses pose significant dangers to the business community
and society. Part VIII concludes the Article, pointing out that this
privatization movement is shortsighted and erroneous. It also proposes that
several course adjustments be made so that our courts and the common law
can become more important and attractive instruments in regulating and
evolving business and commerce.
II. THE ROLE OF THE COMMON LAW AND SYSTEM
OF PRECEDENT IN THE RESOLUTION OF BUSINESS DISPUTES
A foundational principle of American society is to provide citi-
zens-including businesses-with access to legal and political processes
that are open to public scrutiny.8 Yet the widespread privatization of
generally." JOHN G. FLEMING, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TORTs 215
(1985) (emphasis added).
9 See, e.g., LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY COMM. OF THE SOCIETY OF
PROFESSIONALS IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION, PUBLIC ENCOURAGEMENT OF PRIVATE
1999-20001
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business disputes limits the development of such a system. It also distorts
the development of a contemporary body of commercial law. Before we
allow or encourage our courts to become even more removed from this
process, it is helpful to revisit the role of precedent in the development of
commercial law.
A. Precedent Defined
Precedent is defined as "an adjudged case or decision of a court of
justice, considered as furnishing a rule or authority for the determi-
nation of an identical or similar case afterwards arising, or a similar
question of law."9 Stare decisis, the doctrine that courts should follow
precedent in deciding cases, has been in place for centuries"° and remains
"the everyday working rule of our law."'I In law school, through the use of
the case method, students are taught how to identify and use precedent.
More specifically, future attorneys and judges are taught to identify the
holding of a case within the context of the particular dispute, and then
analyze and evaluate its precedential effect. This process is more than
merely academic and does not end upon graduation from law school.
Young trial attorneys soon learn that judges-at least the good ones-do
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: IMPLICATIONS, ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1993),
reprinted in CENTERFORPUBLIC RESOURCES, JUDGE'S DESKBOOKON COURTADR
87 (Elizabeth Plapinger et al. eds., 1993) (noting that a "hallmark of our system of
democratic government has been that private individuals, including the
disadvantaged or less powerful segments of our society, have access to the political
and legal processes, and that governmental decisionmaking is open to public
scrutiny").
9 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1195 (7th ed. 1999).
1 See I SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 68-74 (1775):
For it is an established rule to abide by former precedents, where the same
points come again in litigation: as well as to keep the scale of justice even
and steady, and not liable to waiver with every new judge's opinion; and
also because the law in that case being solemnly declared and determined,
what before was uncertain, and perhaps indifferent, is now become a
permanent rule which is not in the breast of any subsequent judge to alter
or vary from according to his private sentiments: he being not delegated to
pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one.
Id.
" BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921),
reprinted in SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO, at 112
(Margaret E. Hall ed., 1947).
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in fact "examine and compare"' 2 precedent, and that the modification and
development of precedent depends upon a change in the holdings of
individual courts about specific disputes.1 3 When this process is properly
implemented and followed, in the words of Judge Learned Hand, our body
of commercial law grows like a "monument slowly raised, like a coral
reef""4
B. Why Courts Use Precedent
Different theories exist as to why courts use precedent. One holds that
prior judicial decisions serve as the "public record of the 'unwritten law,'
customs and legal traditions, acquiring both their meaning and authority
from recognition as part of the collective wisdom or reason." 5 Under this
theory, "precedent helps establish a smooth transition between the
accumulated experience of the past, evidenced by judicial decisions, and
the present, to which the reasoning of the prior decision is applied,
unless the present court determines that the prior court's reasoning was in
error."'
16
Another theory provides that precedent is powerful and used by courts
not because it represents society's collective wisdom or reasoning, but
because of the authority of the judiciary. 7 Under this view, the judiciary,
as the sovereign, has the authority and right to establish a legal framework
by which rules can be known, legal consequences can be predicted, and
public expectations can thereby be protected. 8 Jeremy Bentham advocated
12 Id.
13 See id. at 114.
14 Learned Hand, Judge Cardozo 's The Nature of the Judicial Process, 35
HARV. L. REV. 479, 479 (1922) (book review). Judge Hand wrote: "[Common
law] stands as a monument slowly raised, like a coral reef, from the minute
accretions of past individuals, of whom each built upon the relics which his
predecessors left, and in his turn left a foundation upon which his successors might
work." Id.
15 Mark D. Hinderks & Steve A. Leben, Restoring the Common in the Law: A
Proposal for the Elimination of Rules Prohibiting the Citation of Unpub-
lished Decisions in Kansas and the Tenth Circuit, 31 WASHBURN L. J. 155, 170
(1992).
16 Id.
17 See id.
8 See id.
1999-2000]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
this view centuries ago,19 and his concern with stability and predictability
can also be found in the writings of contemporary jurists. 20
C. How Courts Use Precedent in Business Cases
Courts use precedent in business cases in a variety of ways. First, they
look to precedent to help resolve the dispute at hand.' Professor Melvin
Eisenberg notes the following with respect to how courts accomplish this
task:
Complex societies characteristically need an institution that can conclu-
sively resolve disputes deriving from a claim of right based on the
application, meaning, and implications ofthe society's existing standards.
In our society that institution is the courts, and the resolution of such
disputes is accordingly a central function of our courts. This centrality is
manifested in a variety of ways. To begin with, courts in our society are
structured to be fundamentally passive. Unlike a legislature, a court may
not properly initiate action on its own motion but may act only when set
9 See Jeremy Bentham, A Comment on the Commentaries, in A COMMENT ON
THE COMMENTARIES AND A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT 196-97, n.c (J.H. Bums
& H.L.A. Hart eds., 1977). Bentham wrote:
The deference that is due to the determination of former judgments is due
not to their wisdom, but to their authority: not in compliment to dead men's
vanity, but in concern for the welfare of the living. That men may be
enabled to predict the legal consequences of an act before they do it: that
public expectation may know what course it has to take: that he who has
property may trust to have it still: that he who meditates guilt may look for
punishment, and in the self-same guilt for the same punishment.... Why
should decisions be uniform? Why should succeeding ones be such as to
appear the natural and expected consequences of those preceding them? Not
because it ought to have been established, but because it is established....
The business of the Judge is to keep the distribution of valuables and of
rewards and punishments in the course of expectation: conformable to what
the expectation of men concerning them is, or if apprised of the
circumstances of each case, as he is, he supposes would be.
Id.
20 See, e.g., Hinderks & Leben, supra note 15, at 171 n.96. Hinderks and Leben
note that Justice Cardozo believed in the general rule of following precedent in
order to ensure the consistent protection of rights and litigants' belief that justice
was evenhanded, consistent and fair.
2 See MELVINARONis ENBERG,THENATUREOFTHECOMMGNLAw4 (1988).
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in motion by a party with a claim. Correspondingly, a court is limited to
action that is responsive to the claim made. The kinds of claims the court
may properly act upon are also limited. The claim normally must be
contested-that is, the subject of a dispute. The claimant normally must
assert that the respondent has either infringed (or threatens to infringe)
upon his rights, or is otherwise at fault in a manner that sufficiently
involves the claimant's interests to render it appropriate for him to make
a claim whose disposition turns on that fault. The claim must be based on
a standard that relates to [business norms] rather than, say, on an artistic
standard. The standard on which the claim is based must rise to a certain
level of significance, in terms of either the seriousness of the injury that
typically results from its violation orthe importance of the norm or policy
that it reflects.2
Second, courts use precedent toffirther enrich the supply oflegal rules
that govern business disputes.'3 Eisenberg also writes:
Our society has an enormous demand for legal rules that actors can live,
plan, and settle by. The legislature cannot adequately satisfy this demand.
The capacity of a legislature to generate legal rules is limited, and much
of that capacity must be allocated to the production of rules concerning
governmental matters, such as spending, taxes, and administration; rules
that are regarded as beyond the courts' competence, such as the definition
of crimes; and rules that are best administered by a bureaucratic machin-
ery, such as the principles for setting the rates charged by regulated
industries. Furthermore, our legislatures are normally not staffed in a
manner that would enable them to perform comprehensively the function
of establishing law to govern action in the private sector. Finally, in many
areas the flexible form of a judicial rule is preferable to the canonical
form of a legislative rule. Accordingly, it is socially desirable that the
courts should act to enrich that supply of legal rules that govern...
[business] conduct-not by taking on lawmaking as a free-standing
function, but by attaching much greater emphasis to the establishment of
legal rules than would be necessary if the courts' sole function was the
resolution of disputes. 24
I Id. (footnotes omitted).
See id.
' Id. at 4-5 (footnotes omitted). In her dissent in Neary v. Regents of the
University of California, Justice Joyce Kennard of the California Supreme Court
reminds us that not only do the courts resolve disputes and enrich the supply of
1999-2000]
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In light of the above, the following question is presented: are today's
courts being utilized to their fullest potential in developing and refining our
body of contemporary commercial law? Parts IV, V and VI point out that,
for a variety of reasons, the answer is no. Part VII highlights the dangers
of this development and why this policy is shortsighted and erroneous.
Before this question can be addressed in detail, we must first consider how
business cases have changed over the years and how those changes have
challenged the courts' ability to efficiently resolve such disputes.
]II. THE CHANGING NATURE OF BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS AND DISPUTES
Our society has changed over the years, as have the nature of our
business transactions and the resulting business disputes courts are being
asked to resolve.
A. Increased Internationalization
In recent years we have witnessed the emergence and development of
a global economy? We no longer live in a world in which local manufac
legal rules that govern those disputes, but their judgments also have "value for
society at large." Neary v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 834 P.2d 119, 130 (Cal. 1992).
For example, Professor Marc Galanter points out that the court system and formal
adjudication "project[s] the standards and threats that parties and lawyers use in
'bargaining in the shadow of the law,"' and it is because courts project such
messages that "parties and lawyers are able to resolve the vast majority of disputes
without burdening the courts"; in other words, the norms that courts broadcast to
society "influence not only disputes that are brought to the courts, but also matters
that never reach the courts." Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to
Anecdote, 55 MD. L.REV. 1093,1101-02 (1996). Similarly, Howard Slavittwrites:
The system of precedent also promotes the protection of private rights and
the resolution of disputes. The system of precedent makes the law more
certain and uniform because it allows courts separated geographically and
temporally to exchange their decisions and reasoning. It creates guidelines
within which individual judges must operate to avoid reversal. By making
the law more certain, it also allows individuals to structure their affairs to
avoid disputes and litigation.
Howard Slavitt, Selling the Integrity of the System of Precedent: Selective
Publication, Depublication, and Vacatur, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 109, 140
(1995) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
2 See RICHARD SCHAFFER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINEss LAW AND ITS
ENVIRONMENT 4-6 (4th ed. 1999) (noting the arrival of a global marketplace due
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turers use local materials and labor to create a product for sale only in a
local market. Instead, many products are made for a national or interna-
tional market. It is not uncommon for manufacturers to "obtain raw
materials or parts in one country, perform subassembly in another country,
[with] final assembly [occurring] in yet another, then deliver [the] products
'just in time' to customers in several countries. 12 6 This phenomenon has
presented difficult and complex choice of forum, choice of law, discovery,
and judgment enforcement issues for courts, especially state courts
unfamiliar with such issues.27
B. The Proliferation of Secondary Rights and Case Complexity
It is not only the increased internationalization of the marketplace that
has presented courts with new and difficult business disputes to resolve;
there has also been a proliferation of "secondary rights" in many types of
business cases. This has in turn significantly increased the complexity of
many business disputes. Some commentators label this development the
"law of contorts." '28 By way of example, twenty years ago a dispute
to recent political and economic events).
2 Byron Acohido, Expansion Express-Airlines, Air-Freight Companies Enter
High Stakes Arena of Global Delivery, SEATTLE TIMES, June 3, 1990, at El. See
also, SCHAFFER ET AL., supra note 25, at 484 (discussing how a Japanese
automaker can produce cars in a Mexican assembly plant using parts sourced from
countries around the world, and then export those Mexican-made cars to the United
States).
27 See SCHAFFER ET AL., supra note 25, at 105-30; CHARLES PLATrO &
MICHAEL LEE, OBTAINING EVIDENCE IN ANOTHER JURISDICTION IN BUSINESS
DISPUTES 181-90 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing the difficulty of conducting discovery
and taking evidence abroad in England and the former West Germany). One of the
authors recently represented several California companies who became entangled
in litigation involving complex issues of international law due to their business
activities. Several years ago, these companies were not even selling their products
outside of the West Coast, let alone the United States, and they never would have
been involved in such complex litigation.
I Elia Weinbaeh & Sydelle Pittas, Contorts, in BUSINESS TORTS LITIGATION
108 (Litigation Section of the A.B.A., 1992) (footnote omitted). Weinbach and
Pittas write:
The pun inherent in this chapter title is apt. As current concepts of justice
and fair play dictate that the law be molded (some might say, contorted) to
fit litigation arising from new and more complex business situations, the
bright line between injuries that 'sound in contract' and in tort, and their
consequent remedies, fades. Thus we come to the law of contorts.
1999-2000]
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between a law firm and its client over fees, to the extent that unpaid fees
were even pursued, normally consisted of the law firm filing a complaint
for breach of contract, with the client in turn filing an answer that alleged
a few straightforward affirmative defenses. Discovery in the case was clean
and simple, as were the legal issues. Today, that same dispute results in the
client not only filing an answer, but a counterclaim for professional
negligence (usually for leverage purposes), and the cost and complexity of
the case is thereby significantly increased. Similarly, in the past a licensor
who licensed a patent to a licensee and then discovered that the licensee
was misusing the patent was likely to allege that the right that had been
violated was the licensing agreement (i.e., it was breached). Today, that
same case will see a plethora of secondary rights--"contorts"--come into
play based on contract law, federal patent law, and unfair competition
law.' Specificaly, as in the past, the licensor's complaint will allege a cause
of action for breach of the licensing agreement. But it will also allege a
cause of action for patent infringement-in part to attempt to obtain the
benefit oftreble damages29 versus typical breach of contract damages. Also,
the licensee will bring its own counterclaim for unfair competition and
antitrust violations. In a nutshell, these secondary rights often transform
what used to be a relatively straightforward business case into the exact
opposite.30
29 See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994).
30 See generally Jeffrey W. Stempel, A More Complete Look at Complexity, 40
ARIZ. L. REV. 781, 819 (1998) ("[I]t seems fair to conclude that there has been
major growth... of complex cases."). Stempel's article provides a good discussion
(but from a different angle) on the growth of complexity in commercial cases. See
also Christine Gail Clark, Comment, The Sky is Falling-The ALI's Efficient
Response to Courts in Crisis?, 1995 BYU L. REV. 997, 1003-16 (discussing the
increased complexity in cases due to the multiple parties now involved, the
complexity in pretrial proceedings, the complexity during trial, and the complexity
in choosing and administering remedies); Alvin B. Rubin, Bureaucratization ofthe
Federal Courts: The Tension Between Justice and Efficiency, 55 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 648, 649 (1980) ("Our 1940 cases were largely one or two issue matters.
Today appeals involve records of thousands of pages and briefs arguing dozens of
issues.").
Relatedly, the arrival and availability of class and derivative actions has also
challenged the ability of the courts to resolve disputes. For example, class actions
involving asbestos exposure have posed complex choice of law problems for the
courts. See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 878 F. Supp. 473 (E.D.N.Y.
1995). The Agent Orange cases have also pushed courts to their limits. See
generally Peter H. Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The
Agent Orange Example, 53 U. CHi. L. REv. 337 (1986).
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C. Increased Speed
Many of today's business transactions and markets, especially in an era
of electronic commerce, move faster than ever before. Take Internet
entrepreneurs as an example. In the past such entrepreneurs did not think
in terms ofthe patentability oftheirbusiness ideas andinventions.3 1 Yetthe
market is now forcing them to do so, and they are discovering that it can
take eighteen months just for a patent to be issued 2 let alone litigate any
related ownership dispute in the courts. By the time such litigation is
resolved, "the cyber-marketplace will have changed several times over,"
33
thereby often making the end-result of the litigation irrelevant. In short,
courts sometimes find it difficult to keep pace with a marketplace that
demands such quick resolutions.34 Another example is the venture capital
arena. Today, "most venture capitalists look for companies that can provide
liquidity in three to five years."35 he venture capital process now moves
so quickly that it can be fatal for a start-up company to be tied up in
litigation to sort out its "legal messes," even for a short period of time.
D. Disaffection with the New Law Merchant
Marc Galanter points out that in our society certain "indigenous
forums" exist that operate by "codes of conduct" independent of the law. 6
Professor Robert Cooter adds that with respect to trade and commerce,
many business communities are self-regulating and promulgate their own
31See Wendy R. Leibowitz, Lawyers and Technology: Patents and E-Business,
NAT'LL.J., June 14, 1999, at A19.32 See id.
33 Id. See generally Wendy R. Leibowitz, Lawyers and Technology: Let's Settle
This, Online, NAT'LL.J., July 5, 1999, atA20 (noting the proliferation ofweb sites
devoted to online ADR to help businesses resolve disputes more quickly).
3 To speed up business dispute resolution, many courts have implemented
"rocket dockets" or "fast-track" systems. See Carrie E. Johnson, Comment, Rocket
Dockets: Reducing Delay in Federal CivilLitigation, 85 CAL. L. REV. 225 (1997);
Michael A. Friedrichs, Note, Fast Track: A Panacea for a Delayed and Cluttered
Court System?, 1 SAN DIEGO JUST. J. 443 (1993). But the efficacy and quality of
these systems is unclear. See Johnson, supra, at 238-54; Friedrichs, supra, at 449-
56.
35 CONSTANCE E. BAGLEY & CRAIG E. DAUCHY, THE ENTREPRENEUR'S GUIDE
TO BUSINESS LAW 191 (1998).
36 See Marc Galanter, Compared to What? Assessing the Quality of Dispute
Processing, 66 DENV. U. L. REV. xi, xiii (1989).
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norms, rules, and enforcement mechanisms. 37 As examples, he cites such
professions as accounting and law, and "formal networks like Visa [that]
promulgate their own rules."'3 Cooter creatively labels such norms and
rules the "new law merchant."'39 Yet when businesspersons become
disaffected with the "new law merchant" that governs their particular
industry, they often turn to the courts as a last resort for help.4 As an
example, consider the entrepreneurs who become entangled in domain
name disputes and subscriber problems with Internet service providers.
One would think that the norms (or "new law merchant") of that industry
would make it ideal for the disputing parties to sit down and resolve the
matter short of a lawsuilt.41 Yet the opposite is occurring. Many of these
parties instead want their day in court-yet again requiring the courts to
address a new, different, and complex type of business dispute.42
IV. BUSINESSES TURNING TO PRIVATE
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
We now return to the question earlier posed: are today's courts being
utilized to their fullest potential in developing and refining our body of
11 See Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy, 23 SW.
U. L. REv. 443,443-46 (1994).381 Id. at 445 (footnote omitted).
39 Id.
4 See Timothy P. Terrell & James H. Wildman, Rethinking "Professionalism,"
41 EMORY L.J. 403 (1992). Terrell and Wildman note:
[T]he legal system embodies our last remaining vestige of a sense of
"community"-of shared values and expectations. All the other dimensions
of our lives-race, religion, education, the arts, regional loyalty, and so
on-divide us as much as they join us together because they are based on
matters of "substance" on which we so often disagree.
Id. at 422. They further argue:
[W]e are connected to each other in the nature of the claims we make
against each other: we do not ordinarily result to self-help or depend upon
various informal social groups like churches, families, or friends to take up
our cause. Instead, we invoke our system of law, both because we have
come to have faith in it and because we have largely abandoned other
alternatives.
Id. at 423.
4 See Leibowitz, supra note 31, at A20 (describing recent cyber efforts aimed
at mediating domain name disputes and subscriber problems with Internet service
providers).
42 See id. (noting that this cybermediation effort was unsuccessful because the
"parties wanted their day in a real-world court").
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contemporary commercial law? Similarly, have courts done a good job of
adapting to the changes in the nature of business transactions and disputes
earlier discussed? If business behavior is used as the primary indicator in
answering this question, many would say that the answer is no, as over the
past several decades businesses have been increasingly turning to private
ADR to resolve their disputes.43 In this section, we discuss some of the
I3 In the early 1980s several Fortune 500 companies founded the Center for
Public Resources ("CPR") Institute for Dispute Resolution to explore private
dispute resolution as an alternative to litigation when involved in a dispute with one
another. A "CPR Pledge" was created in which member companies promised to
explore ADR before litigating with each other. CPR obtained 50 signatories to that
Pledge in 1983. By mid-1999, that number had grown to 4000. CPR Corporate
Policy Statement or Alternatives to Litigation (visited Nov. 4, 1999)
<http://www.cpradr.org/corppldg.htm>. In the early 1990s, a similar CPR Pledge
was developed for law firms, which now has more than 1500 law firm signatories,
including 400 of the nation's largest 500 law firms. See LawFirm Pledge (visited
Nov. 4, 1999) <http://www.cpradr.org/lf.pol.htm>.
Recent surveys also confirm an increase inthe use of private ADR by American
business. A 1994 survey conducted by Arthur Anderson LLP General Counsel and
Corporate Legal Times found that almost 50% of those surveyed had used ADR
within the last year-with 75% of these companies reporting an increase in use
from the previous year. The Survey also found that large companies use ADR more
than smaller companies. SeeLegal Costs andADR Use, 13 ALTERNATIVES TOHIGH
COSTLTIG. 141,141 (1995); see alsoNews FromAroundthe States: SurveyShows
Increase in Corporate ADR Use, 6 WORLD ARD. & MEDIATION REP. 145, 145
(1995). In response to a 1994 CPR survey of corporate law firms, more than 80%
indicated that client interest in ADR had increased over the previous three years.
See SUSAN SCoTr, LAW FIRM PRACTICES IN ADR. 1994 SURVEY FINDINGS 10
(1995). A 1992 Business WeeklHarris Executive poll found that 97% of the
business executives surveyed stated thattheir companies favor making greateruse
of ADR. See Michele Galen, Guilty, BUS. WK., Apr. 13, 1992, at 66.
Private ADR providers also report a significant increase in business. The total
number of private arbitrations and mediations handled through the American
Arbitration Association ("AAA") alone has nearly doubled in the past decade, to
a projected 90,000 in 1998. See Kleiner, supra note 6, at 90. AAA reports a
significant increase in recent years in its real estate cases, computer cases,
employment cases, franchise cases, and patent, trademark, and copyright disputes.
See AAA DISP. RESOL. TIMES, Spring 1994, at 1. Judicial Arbitration and
Mediation Services ("JAMS") saw its caseload increase from 8249 in 1990 to
18,049 in 1996. See John Gibeaut, At the Crossroads, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1998, at 61.
See also Mike France, More Big Businesses Ask: Can We Talk Not Sue?,
NAT'L L.J., Mar. 13, 1995, at B1 (reporting how the nation's biggest banks are
considering signing an intra-industry treaty to turn to ADR before resorting to
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primary reasons for this development, but even more importantly, why
many of these reasons may be grounded more on misconception than fact.
A. Perceived Court Congestion and Delay
For those who advocate an increased role for ADR in resolving
business disputes, the point is often made that the courts are congested, rife
with delay, and inaccessible due to a "litigation explosion." One
commentator has noted that with the "excessive delays and exploding
caseloads of the civil courts, many disputants view traditional litigation as
unable to meet their conflict resolution needs. More and more parties are
turning away from the judicial system and are resorting to private dispute
resolution firms. ''45 Certainly, many business executives and their in-house
counselperceive that a litigation explosion has occurred.'
litigation, and that such intra-industry agreements have already been signed by top
corporations in the food, commercial insurance, franchise and commercial
inventory finance business); Jaret Seiberg, Capital Briefs: Justices Approve
Mandatory Arbitration Clauses, AM. BANKER, May 22, 1996, at 2 (reporting a
banking association lawyer's comment that the banking industry is making greater
use of arbitration agreements); Bonnie Hayes, Lawsuit Boom? Here's Evidence to
the Contrary, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1997, (Orange County Edition) at B3
("[O]thers also credit an increase in arbitration for the decline in civil court cases.
An increasing number of businesses, they say, are adding mandatory arbitration
clauses to contracts."); Tom Arnold, A Better Mousetrap: ADR, Vol. XXX No. 1,
LES NOUVELLES, at 31 (Mar. 1995) ("Beginning perhaps about 1987-1988 a
number of major companies started making major shifts from Rambo or other
strong litigation practice to ADR. Some of them were companies with 100 lawyers
or so on staff-companies like Bank of America, Motorola, and major insurance
companies."); Faye Riva Cohen, Advantages ofAlternativeDispute Resolution (pt.
2), LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 3, 1993, at 4, 21 (stating that "Business and
insurance carriers are increasingly seeking to reduce the costs of civil litigation"
and pointing out that to deal with the perceived problems in the legal system and
to enhance their ability to compete, many companies are turning to ADR).
" See, e.g., Harry N. Scheiber, Innovation, Resistance, and Change: A History of
JudicialReform and the California Courts, 1960-1990,66 S. CAL.L.REv. 2049,2052
(1993) ("Complaints of a crisis in the courts, involving intolerable delays and
congestion, in fact, have been heard regularly throughout the twentieth century-not
only in California, but in many other states and in the federal courts.").
4 Lucille M. Ponte, Putting Mandatory Summary Jury Trial Back On the
Docket: Recommendations on the Exercise ofJudicialAuthoity, 63 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1069, 1069 (1995) (footnote omitted).
46 See John Lande, Failing Faith in Litigation? A Survey ofBusiness Lawyers'
and Executives' Opinions, 3 HARv. NEG. L. REv. 1, 26,36 (1998) (indicating that
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The cause of this so-called litigation explosion has been the subject of
intense debate. The list of proffered reasons includes the growing diversity
and size of the American population, a heightened level of litigiousness
among Americans, an increase in the number ofjudicially and statutorily
created rights and a broadening of the definition of the class of people
entitled to enforce those rights, expanded discovery, excessive lawmaking,
and an increase in crime and criminal prosecutions (especially drug-related
offenses).47 But what is interesting to note is that to the extent such an
explosion has occurred, no study exists which suggests it has been
disproportionately fueled by business cases. Further, Marc Galanter, other
scholars, and even some judges point out that the claim of a "litigation
explosion!' is vastly exaggerated, if not outright false.48 Finally, many
94% of the business executives and 82% of the in-house counsel surveyed believe
that there has been a litigation explosion in the past ten years. In addition, 86% of
the business executives and 79% of the in-house counsel surveyed believe that less
than half of lawsuits involving business are resolved within an appropriate amount
of time).
47 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JUSTICE (1985); DONALD L.
HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977); BRUCE H. MANN,
NEIGHBORS AND STRANGERS: LAWAND COMMUNITY IN EARLY CONNECTICUT 101-
36 (1987); Bayless Manning, Hyperlexis: OurNationalDisease, 71 Nw.U.L.REV.
767 (1977); Wade H. McCree, Jr., Bureaucratic Justice: An Early Warning, 129 U.
PA. L. REV. 777,794-96 (1981); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 376 (1982) [hereinafter Resnik, Managerial Judges]; Judith Resnik, Failing
Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494 (1986)
[hereinafter Resnik, Failing Faith].48 See Galanter, supra note 24, at 1102-09 (noting that litigation rates have been
relatively stable, and to the extent they have increased, these increases have only
occurred in limited types of cases such as criminal law, family law, and certain
types of product liability cases); Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of
Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our
Allegedly Contentious andLitigious Society, 31 UCLAL.REV. 4 (1983) (assessing
the inaccuracy of the litigation explosion claim). See also DONNA STIENSTRA &
THOMASE. WILLGING, ALTERNATIVES TO LITIGATION:DO THEYHAVEAPLACEIN
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS? 33 (Federal Judicial Center 1995) ("[I]n the
aggregate, federal civil caseloads have been decreasing in recent years" and "the
civil trial rate.., is already very low and has been steadily declining for the past
decade in nearly all federal courts, those with ADR and those without ADR
alike."); THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF
THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 32 (1994) (noting the "hyperbole and metaphor"
among those advocating court reform due to the increased number of cases); Jack
B. Weinstein, After Fijfty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are the
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business executives and their corporate counsel are finding that private
ADR does not always live up to its billing in this regard, and if anything,
often results in excessive delay.49
B. Expense
Private ADR is often touted as being cheaper than traditional
litigation.5" Again, there is evidence that suggests that business executives
Barriers toJusticeBeingRaised?, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1909 (1989) (asserting
that the litigation explosion idea "is wrong as a matter of fact").
49 See Harold Brown, Alternative Dispute Resolution Realities and Remedies,
30 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 743 (1997). Professor Brown notes:
Timing factors can also be challenging. A fundamental attraction of ADR
is its inherent promise of speedy and inexpensive process. [But] [w]ithout
rules and a governing court, there is no limit to such crucial matters as the
timing for pretrial logistics, the pace of the conduct of the proceedings, and
the rendering of a speedy decision. While these matters might appear to be
marginal, the fact is that arbiters are often... pressed for time. They may
have to extend the time limits to an extraordinary extent. For example,
without explicit time regulations, there would be no way to compel the
making of a final determination no matter how long the delay.
Id. at 767-68. See also Jeffrey G. Kichaven, ADR Does Not Save Time or Money?
Great News!, DISP.RESOL.MAG., Summer 1997, at 15 ("[R]esearch by the RAND
Institute for Civil Justice concludes mediation did not significantly affect the
number of lawyer work hours or the time to disposition in the federal civil court
programs it studied. In other words, ADR does not save time or money."); Arthur
S. Hayes & Ann Hagedom, Arbitration in Commercial Cases Found to Save
Money, Not Time, WALL ST. J., Sept. 5, 1990, at B10 (discussing another RAND
study which found that arbitration in high-stakes commercial cases does not speed
the process of resolving disputes).
50 The CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution claims that for a five-year period
ending in 1995, 652 companies using CPR panelists reported a total cost savings
of over $200 million, with an average cost savings of more than $300,000 per
company. See Fortune 500 Companies Find Benefits in Adopting ADR Policy
(visitedDec. 30,1999) <http://www.cpradr.org/poll I597.htm>. See also Ellen Joan
Pollock, Mediation Firms Alter the Landscape, WALL. ST. J., Mar. 22, 1993, at B I
("Since 1990,406 companies.., saved more than $150 million in legal fees and
expert-witness costs by using litigation alternatives" in cases with an aggregate of
over $5 billion in dispute.); Arnold, supra note 43, at 33 ("[W]ith sophisticated use
of ADR you can save millions of dollars. We have done patent infringement suits
via ADR, as counsel, for $60,000. In the courthouse it is hard to find the patent
case where you can assure the client of a budget under a million.").
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and their in-house counsel at leastperceive that the traditional court system
is too expensive.51 However, due to a lack of empirical data, it is unclear
whether ADR is, in fact, cheaper than traditional litigation.52 Some
commentators contend that it is not,53 and as Marc Galanter notes, critics
of the cost aspect of litigation often ignore the benefits:
5, See Lande, supra note 46, at 35-36 (stating that 96% of the business
executives and 91% of the in-house counsel surveyed believe that less than half of
the lawsuits involving a business are resolved at an appropriate cost).
51 See Richard C. Reuben, The DarkSide ofADR, CAL. LAW., Feb. 1994, at 54
("For all the promised benefits of ADR, independent statistics documenting them
are almost nonexistent. One reason is the secrecy of the proceedings; few records
exist for researchers to examine."); Editorial, MandatoryADR: Can We Talk?, 78
JUDICATURE 272, 272 (May-June 1995) (noting the lack of empirical support for
many ADR claims); Kim Dayton, The Myth ofAlternative Dispute Resolution in
the Federal Courts, 76 IOwA L. REV. 889, 906 n.81 (1991) ("One of the principal
obstacles to conducting legitimate empirical research on the effect ofADR... is
the failure.., adequately to document the use and consequences of ADR-").
I See Reuben, supra note 52, at 54 (citing an arbitration that produced a
$15,000 award and $6000 in attorneys' fees butwas more than offsetby a$30,000
legal bill and $9000 for the arbitrator's services, and how, had the case stayed in
the public system and gone to trial, the parties would not have had to even pay for
the judge); id. at 57 (citing another example where an arbitrator submitted an
unitemized discovery bill for $28,000, and had the case stayed in the public court
system, the discovery costs would have been the $14 filing fee per motion, plus
court reporters' fees); James J. Alfini, Summary Jury Trials in State and Federal
Courts: A Comparative Analysis of the Perceptions of Participating Lawyers, 4
OHIO ST.J. ONDISP.RESOL. 213,229-31 (1989) (citing a study in which amajority
of the federal lawyers asserted that their billable hours increased when the ADR
mechanism of a summary jury trial was used, and that few summary jury trial cases
were actually completed within the half-day goal that was established); Robert J.
Lewton, Comment, Are Mandatory, Binding Arbitration Requirements a Viable
Solution for Employers Seeking to Avoid Litigating Statutory Employment
Discrimination Claims?, 59 ALB. L. REV. 991, 1032 (1996) (noting that binding
arbitration in employer-employee disputes may prove to be "just as expensive,
time-consuming, and disruptive to litigate challenges brought against a mandatory,
binding arbitration requirement as it is to litigate"); Kleiner, supra note 6, at 91
(discussing a classroom exercise in which a school insurance company settled for
an excessive sum because the other side misrepresented certain facts during the
ADR process, and that given the nature of the ADR process those
misrepresentations went unchecked).
Further, Professor Brown writes:
The dollar cost of... [ADR] may be substantial, particularly because it is
totally supported by user fees. Some discovery may be avoided, but the
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[S]ociety's accounts should reflect not only the costs but the benefits of
enforcing such transfers, which afford vindication, induce investments in
safety, and deter undesirable behavior. For instance, the sums transferred
by successful patent infringement litigation not only are not lost, but
maintain the credibility of the patent system that in turn has powerful
incentive effects. To put forward estimates of gross costs-even ones that
are notmake-believe-as a sufficient guide to policy displays indifference
to the vital functions that the law performs.54
C. Perceived Juror Ignorance and Bias Against Business
Another reason why businesses may be increasingly turning to private
ADR is because they perceive thatjuries do a poorjob determining liability
and assessing damages in lawsuits against businesses and judge businesses
more harshly than individuals. 5 The following statement from a business
executive is typical:
Is it any surprise that many commercial contracts these days have a clause
where each party waives its right to a trial by jury? Doesn't that tell you
something? That they are not willing to trust twelve peers off the street
with the complexity of their business transaction... And that doesn't
daily charges of the impartial arbiters may substantially exceed such
savings... The arbitrator has exclusive power to order extensive and
expensive discovery, thus wiping out much of the supposed economies.
The hearing dates may greatly increase costs where the ever-busy
arbitrator has other commitments that cause repeated postponements and
delay, or interruptions to accommodate unrelated court assignments of
counsel because courts seldom recognize any priority for conflicts with
AD1M
Brown, supra note 49, at 760-61. He also points out that contrary to the oft-
trumpeted claim of ADR being "less expensive," the dependence on user fees by
such organizations as AAA often make ADR the exact opposite. See id. at 764-66.
4 Galanter, supra note 24, at 1142.
s See Lande, supra note 46, at 33-34 (indicating that 58% of the business
executives and 46% of the in-house counsel surveyed believe that in less than half
of cases do juries do a good job in determining liability in lawsuits by individuals
against businesses; 82% of the business executives and 74% of the in-house
counsel surveyed thought that in less than half of cases do juries do a good job of
assessing damages. Further, 75% of the business executives and 73% of the in-
house counsel surveyed believe that juries judge businesses more harshly than
individuals).
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mean that people are stupid. It means that businesses have become very
complex in many respects. The nature of their product offerings, not
necessarily how the business is run, but the nature of the products. Open
up the insides of a laptop computer and try to have some jury decide
whether or not there has been a patent infringement on the design of a
microchip. I certainly wouldn't be capable of doing that.
5 6
Yet, the research of Valerie Hans, William Lofquist and others strongly
suggests that if anything, the contrary is true and that juries do know what
they are doing and do give businesses the benefit of the doubt.5 7
D. Perceived Lack of Expertise in the Judges Presiding Over Business
Disputes
In theory, another touted benefit of many forms of private ADR is the
ability to select a "dispute resolver" with "expertise" in the business issue
56 Id. at 34 (Apr. 15, 1994 interview quote from a business executive). See also
Arnold, supra note 43, at 33 (making essentially the same point); Pollock, supra note
50, atBI ("Imagine alegal system inwhich companies couldputtheir disputes before
judges of their choice... [and] avoid the uncertainty of jury verdicts.").
57 See Valerie P. Hans & William S. Lofquist, Jurors' Judgments ofBusiness
Liability in Tort Cases: Implications for the Litigation Explosion Debate, 26 L. &
SOC'YREV. 85 (1992) (a study ofjurors in cases involving businesses which found
that most jurors were skeptical of plaintiffs' claims against businesses and did not
generally believe that businesses should be held to a higher standard than
individuals); Valerie P. Hans, The Contested Role of the Civil Jury in Business
Litigation, 79 JUDICATURE 242 (1996) (pointing out that the criticisms that juries
in business cases are pro-plaintiff, that their decisions are based more on sympathy
and prejudice than facts, and that they focus on the business defendant's deep
pockets appear unfounded). See also RALPH NADER & WESLEY J. SMITH, No
CONTEST: CORPORATE LAWYERS AND THE PERVERSION OF JUSTICE IN AMERICA
266-76 (1996) (noting that contrary to popular perception, juries are actually
inclined to rule in favor of business). In support of their position, Nader and
Wesley cite, among other things, the research of Jury Verdict Research, a
Pennsylvania legal publishing company that compiles court statistics. See id. at
276. Marc Galanter adds that while our "courts could improve juror performance
in many ways," ".serious students of the jury are virtually unanimous in their high
regard for the jury as a decision-maker" and "researchers concur that jurors on the
whole are conscientious, that they collectively understand and recall the evidence
as well as judges, and that they decide factual issues on the basis of the evidence
presented." Galanter, supra note 24, at 1109. See also Edward Bodaken & William
Slusser, Want to Win Complex IP Tials? Simplify, Simplify, NAT'L L. J., July 26,
1999, at C11 (noting the simple, common-sense steps that a good trial lawyer can
take to make a complex intellectual property case understandable to a jury).
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at hand." Judges in the traditional court system, on the other hand, are
sometimes perceived to lack such expertise,59 especially by business
executives. 0 To the extent that a lack of such expertise exists, the
5 See Mladen Singer, New Boundary: Arbitration in Various Discipline[s]:
CommercialArbitration as aMeansforResolvinglndustrial Property and Transfer
of Technology Disputes, 3 CROAT. ARB. Y.B. 107 (1996):
A further advantage... [of ADR] over litigation is the possible expertise
of the arbitrators. It is particularly important in industrial property disputes
that often involve complicated technical issues. Judges are usually not
trained in technology, a problem in common law countries where factual
determinations are made by juries. It requires extensive use of experts
and/or expert witnesses, which is one of the things that makes industrial
property litigation very expensive. However, even when experts or experts
witnesses are used, the final decisions are brought by judges or juries, not
by persons knowledgeable about the technology at stake. By using
commercial arbitration, parties can have an adjudicator who is
knowledgeable about both: respective industrial property laws, and a[bout]
technology. Moreover... arbitration panels can provide parties with
extreme diversity of knowledge....
When making a list of arbitrators for patent disputes, American
Arbitration Association (AAA) included people having expertise in all
fields of technology and who also had a legal education.
Id. at 111-12.
59 See Peter D. Zeughauser, What's in a Name? Plenty, AM. LAW., Apr. 1996,
at 44. Zeughauser notes:
I had two maxims about litigation that served as the sobering cold water
necessary to avoid costly litigation and instead engage in ADR: The first
was that litigation is the sport of kings; the second was that the courtroom
is a dangerous place. After all, what sober-minded business person wants
an important dispute decided.., by a former D.A. who was appointed to
the bench because of his or her skill in locking people away for crimes that
were more often than not self-evident?
Id. Judge Jack Weinstein also makes the point that many judges come to the bench
as generalists. See Jack B. Weinstein, Limits on Judges Learning, Speaking and
Acting-Part I-Tentative First Thoughts: How May Judges Learn?, 36 ARIZ. L.
REV. 539, 540-41 (1994).
0 See Lande, supra note 46, at 32. Lande comments:
Yet another reason why... executives reacted negatively to litigation is that
they believed that it is not framed in terms of their substantive concerns,
which they think are often too complex for the courts. This view was
expressed by a utility company executive: "Judges are trained in the law,
not necessarily in the fundamentals of a particular industry or avenue of
commerce. They're coached on fairness and precedent and things like that.
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politicization of judicial selections" and even their salaries6 2 may
contribute to the problem. Yet the lack of expertise is by no means unique
to judges in the traditional court system. If anything, businesses are finding
that it may be even more acute with respect to many purported "ADR
specialists."63
... For example, we have a number of disputes with people who we
transact with in a transmission grid. Well, that's a very complex
engineering-econometric type of consideration where we use those
mechanisms. It's just not the type of thing you want to bring to the courts."
Id. Relatedly, Lande found that 67% of business executive respondents and 68%
of in-house counsel respondents disagreed with the statement that"the legal system
generally considers the needs and practices of particular business communities."
Id. at 34-35.
6 For an interesting historical discussion on the selection of federal judges and
the politicization of the process, see SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL
JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN (1997).
For the same regarding President Bush's appointees, see Sheldon Goldman, Bush's
JudicialLegacy: The Final Imprint, 76 JUDICATURE 282 (Apr.-May 1993). For the
same regarding President Clinton's appointees, see Sheldon Goldman & Elliot
Slotnick, Clinton's Second Term Judiciary. Picking Judges Under Fire, 82
JUDICATURE 264 (May-June 1999).
' See William C. Smith, Bailing From the Bench, A.B.A. J., May, 1999, at 22
(discussing how the disparity between law firm salaries and judicial salaries is
driving experienced judges from the bench).63 Brown, supra note 49. Professor Brown states:
Both mediation and arbitration require specific skills for the impartial
person or persons. For mediators, there is a particular need for the arts of
listening, questioning, fact-finding, and interpreting the views of each party.
The arbitrator needs all of that, plus the courtroom skills of a good judge.
This starts with knowledge and experience in the rules of procedure and
evidence and in substantive law. It may have to be supplemented by
specialized knowledge or a firm determination to acquire the necessary
learning. Arbiters should exclude bias, conflicts of interest, and personal
misconduct toward the parties and their counsel. Anomalously, arbitrators
who are experts or specialists in the substantive field of the dispute are
seldom, if ever, impartial, but that is not ground for removal. Contrary to
widespread opinion, there is no obvious match between the traits that
constitute excellent judicial conduct as against those needed for arbitration
or when compared with the skills appropriate for successful mediation....
The skill levels, substantive experience, and personal biases of the hearing
officer (arbitrator or mediator) are seldom known to the litigants at the time
of their selection. The designation and appointment of judges carries a
much sounder opportunity to obtain quality and impartial services. The
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E. Privacy and Confidentiality
With private ADR, the parties can obtain a large measure of privacy
and confidentiality. Often being a private proceeding, ADR allows
businesses to resolve their disputes without creating a public record.64 For
a business concerned about eroding public confidence in its products or
services, any proceeding that allows it to resolve its disputes outside the
public eye is attractive. s Similarly, ADR is often attractive to a business
concerned about being forced to reveal one or more of its trade secrets
during litigation.66 Businesses may also seek to avoid creating a legal
precedent that may later prove to be disadvantageous to them or their
industry, and are thus drawn to ADR processes in which the likelihood of
a successful appeal is small.67
choice of arbitrators is essentially one of self-appointment by the candidates
with little or no verification, clearance, or appraisal. The parties seldom
know the arbitrators and have no way to obtain knowledge of their skills,
demeanor, bias, and reliability.
Id. at 758,760 (footnotes omitted).
A 1997 joint study by Cornell University's Institute on Conflict Resolution and
Price Waterhouse also found that "many in corporate America remain
uncomfortable with the qualifications of arbitrators and mediators." Cornell
UniversityBusiness News (visitedNov. 4,1999) <http://news.comell.edu.business/
May97/ADRstudy.html>. See also Editorial, Mandatory ADR: Can We Talk?,
supra note 52, at 321 (noting that even "ADR practitioners and supporters have
long worried about problems posed by inadequately trained neutrals and lack of
quality control procedures" and that the "rise of private dispute resolution services
and the apparentwillingness of somejudges to direct parties to particular providers
have rightfully exacerbated these concerns").
" See generally William H. Schroder, Jr., Private ADR May Offer Increased
Confidentiality, NAT'L L.J., July 25, 1994, at C14.
6 See Resnik, Failing Faith, supra note 47, at 538 ("[Mlany defendants (and
their attorneys) in products liability and antitrust cases.., now seem intrigued by
ADR as a means of protecting themselves from negative publicity and from
outcomes they have disliked.").
"See Arnold, supra note 43, at 34 ("Because with ADR you can have a major
measure of confidentiality from competitors."); Cohen, supra note 43, at 4
("[Businesses] also appreciate the privacy and confidentiality factors since most
businesses do not want their competitors, customers, suppliers or franchisers to
know about their lawsuits.").
67 See Brown, supra note 49, at 762 (discussing the common standards for
reviewing and challenging an arbitrator's legal and factual fidings--"manifest
disregard of the law," "arbitrary and capricious," and "completely irrational"--and
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However, many businesses are discovering that the touted privacy and
confidentiality of private ADR is by no means a sure thing and can be
problematic. For example, with respect to mediation, judges who have
ordered a case to mediation often request a status report from the mediator
in order to determine which party is bargaining in good faith and which is
footdragging.68 In other cases, prosecutors may call the mediator or
arbitrator to testify.69 There are also situations in which a company's
decision to seek refuge in the privacy of ADR backfires. Consider a large
company who has been sued by multiple customers. Assume that the
company believes that all of the cases are without merit, but agrees to
mediation, and for economic, publicity, and risk considerations agrees to
pay ten cents on the dollar to settle the first ten cases. As part of its strategy
in mediating the eleventh case, the company may wish to use this data to
its advantage and as evidence of what the case is "worth." However,
depending upon the confidential settlement terms that were reached and
agreed to during the first ten mediations, the company and its counsel may
have failed to think things through and may have inadvertently waived the
ability to utilize such information in the eleventh case. °
F. The AdvertisedAbility ofADR to Provide "Win-Win" Business
Solutions and Preserve Business Relationships
Another touted advantage of private ADR is its ability to offer "win-
win" solutions that courts cannot provide in a business dispute.7' If, for
discussing how these standards are very difficult to satisfy). In California, it has
become virtually impossible to set aside an arbitrator's award because the state
legislature amended the state arbitration act to provide that an arbitrator's award
stands even where an error exists on the face of the award. See id.68 See Michael Higgins, In the Spirit ofMediation, A.BA. ., Mar. 1998, at 94.
69 See id.
71 One of the authors was involved in a recent mediation proceeding that posed
a similar issue for the opposing party and its counsel.71 See, e.g., Arnold, supra note 43, stating:
[W]ith mediation you can enjoy win-win creative business alternative
solutions that courts simply cannot grant. Let me give you an example. A
patentee sued for infringement of its patent on a catalytic cracking process.
The patentee's analysis was:
* It had a one in three chance of winning the court trial.
" If it won, the win would be worth $35,000,000 or thereabouts.
" It was risking about $1,500,000 in litigation costs chasing that
$35,000,000.
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example, a plaintiff's primary goal is to obtain an apology from a defendant
as opposed to monetary compensation, ADR is probably the way to go.'
ADR is frequently viewed as being less hostile than traditional litigation, 3
thereby allowing businesses to better preserve ongoing relationslps.74 Yet
these claimed benefits are often overly simplistic, presumptuous, and even
misleading. There is also nothing that prevents an attorney in traditional
" A guy can get rich betting 1.5 to get 35 at one-to-three odds.
• Therefore, go for it.
What was the wm-wm business alternative solution that we found to resolve
this dispute? The accused infringer offered to sell to the patentee its next 10
years of catalyst requirement at 10% offthe going price. Tis translated into
a $10,000,000 present value to the patentee. The patentee also saved
$1,000,000 m litigation costs. The patent, which we estimated stood a 60%
chance of being held invalid or not enforceable, was not put at risk. At that
time we put a $4,000,000 value on removal of the patent from risk. So the
total value to the patentee of the proposed offer of settlement was estimated
at about $15,000,000. At one to three odds you don't risk $15,000,000
chasing only $35,000.000. What about the accused infringer? It had surplus
plant capacity, would not have any mcreased capital, sales or G&A expense
because of its making this big new sale to a new customer. The infringer's
incremental profit on the new sales projected out to a $15,000,000 present
value to the infringer. $15,000,000 value to each party9 That's what you
call a wm-wm solution.
Id. at 34.
n See, e.g., Andrew Pollack, Japanese Suits on HI. V-TantedBlood Settled,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1996, at A3 ("Some plaintiffs have said they wanted
apologies from the Government and the companies as much as they wanted
compensation.").
I See Cohen, supra note 43, at 4 ("[ADR] also can preserve business
relationships which a more traditional form of suit can destroy.").
74 See Arnold, supra note 43, at 33-34 ("[W]ith ADRyou can preserve ongoing
relationships, licensor-licensee relationships, joint venture relationships, that
litigation inevitably destroys."). The following quote from one rn-house counsel
who was the subject of Lande's study displays a common attitude among
busmesspersons on this issue:
Many of our businesses are with an industry in which it's primarily a
customer-dominated market. In other words, if I have a dispute with a car
company, the overriding consideration is the long-term relationship.
Whether we win, lose, or draw, the economics, how strong our case
is-none of that matters.
Lande, supra note 46, at 19 (quoting from a Jan. 22, 1994 interview with an in-
house counsel).
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litigation from exploring and implementing "win-win" solutions.7 5 In fact,
a well-trained attorney does so and skillfully uses the tools and leverage of
the court system to attain that goal as quickly as possible for his or her
client.76 Moreover, scholars such as Owen Fiss, Marc Galanter, and Mia
Cahill have argued that many disputes involve such important issues that
they should be litigated and that the "feel-good" results of ADR are often
inferior to those obtained in traditional litigation."7
V. CHANGES IN How COURTS SERVICE BUSINESS DISPUTES
While there is disagreement about whether a "litigation explosion" has
occurred, 8 there is little doubt that many people, including many of our
own courts and judges,perceive that one has occurred.79 Our judiciary has
attempted to cope with this perceived increase in its workload primarily
through the following tools: (1) managerial judging; (2) the process of
"self-bureaucratization"; (3) the forcing of business cases into some foa
of ADR (often against the parties' will); and finally, (4) through the
increased use of vacatur, selective publication and the adoption of no-
citation rules, depublication, and filings under seal and confidential
settlements. As shown below, for the businesses that do decide to enter into
75 See Arnold, supra note 43. Arnold's example is in reality one that highlights
the creativity of the remedy and legal counsel rather than the failings of the court
system.
76 The following is a common example in traditional litigation: One party sends
out a series of document requests, deposition notices and interrogatories with a
settlement offer. The settlement offer is timed to expire shortly before the discovery
is due. This strategy can and often does serve as an effective impetus to get the
parties to sit down, communicate and resolve the case.
17 See Fiss, supra note 6; Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle".
Judicial Promotion and Regulation ofSettlements, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1339 (1994)
(arguing that from a substantive standpoint, settled resolutions are not necessarily
superior to litigated ones).78 See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
79 See supra note 46 and accompanying text. For authorities discussing the
judiciary's perception of a litigation explosion, see Macklin Fleming, Court
Survival in theLitigation Explosion, 54 JUDICATURE 109 (June-July 1970); DANIEL
J. MEADOR, APPELLATE COURTS: STAFF AND PROCESS IN THE CRISIS OF
VOLUME-ANAPPELLATE JUSTICE PROJECT OF THENATIONAL CENTERFOR STATE
COURTS 7-9 (1974); Robert H. Bork, Dealing with the Overload in Article 111
Courts, 70 F.R.D. 78, 231 (1976); Nancy Levit, The Caseload Conundrum,
Constitutional Restraint and the Manipulation ofJurisdiction, 64 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 321 (1989).
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the traditional court system, these tools amount to yet another level of
privatization, thereby further distorting and thwarting the growth of our
common law.
A. Managerial Judging
Professor Judith Resnik has written extensively about what she calls
"managerial judging"--where judges become involved in the pretrial
management of the case to try and relieve perceived court congestion (e.g.,
ruling on discovery disputes, deciding joinder issues, conducting pretrial
conferences, settlement conferences, and the like).80 This type of judging
poses several dangers. First, a deeper involvement by judges in the pretrial
phase of thd case may compromise their independence and prematurely
cause them to favor one side or position in the dispute, in turn impacting
the quality of their deliberations. 81 Second, and more importantly for the
purposes of this article, managerial judging undercuts the obligation and
requirement that judges act in public and formally record the reasons
behind what they do.82
The following is an example of the second problem. In the past, a
young attorney who wanted to learn how a particular judge handled pretrial
matters (e.g., discovery motions) could walk over to the courthouse and
spend the morning in the gallery of the judge's courtroom observing the
judge ruling on various law and motion matters. But now this is becoming
more and more difficult to accomplish. Today, it is not uncommon for the
case to be called and the parties' counsel to be led into the judge's private
chambers (or a conference room) to sit down and discuss the case with the
judge (or a discovery referee or judge pro tem). With no court reporter
present, the matter is argued and decided. This same routine is then
repeated for every case on the calendar.83 Relatedly, and perhaps even more
disturbingly, today's courts and judges are often evaluated not for the
quality of their decisions (e.g., how often they are appealed and reversed),
but for their ability to move cases along and clear the docket.84 While the
'o See Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 47; Resnik, FailingFaith, supra
note 47. See also Rubin, supra note 30.8
, See Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 47.
82 See id.
83 This has been the authors' experience, particularly in California's state court
system.
14 For example, the California Judicial Council publishes time-on-the-docket
statistics for some of its courts. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., JUDICIAL COUNCIL
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impact of this management philosophy on the development of our
contemporary body of commercial law is difficult to measure, we submit
that it is more deleterious than beneficial.
B. The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary
We have also witnessed an increase in the size of the judiciary and its
support staff (e.g., magistrates, special masters, judge pro tems, discovery
referees, law clerks, staff attorneys, and the like), as well as an increase in
judges' reliance on that staff." Owen Fiss, Joseph Vining, and Judge Alvin
Rubin refer to this development as the "bureaucratization of the
judiciary." 6 When judges delegate responsibility for initially assessing or
deciding portions of a case to their support staff, they diminish their own
level of personal responsibility for their decisions, which in turn leads to
greater anonymity in judging. 7 This results in the impression that these
decisions have not been rendered or written by an individual with an
identity of their own, but are instead the product of an impersonal
institution.8 The downside of this impersonalization is that it gives
businesses another reason to flee the court system for private ADR, thereby
further distorting the growth of our commercial precedent.8 9
C. Courts Forcing Business Cases into ADR
The problem is not just a case of businesses wanting to avoid the
traditional court system. Our courts have made the conscious policy
decision to divert business cases into ADR in order to conserve judicial
REPORT ON COURT STATISTICS (1997). Inevitably, these statistics become
ammunition in various political and public policy battles.8 See Owen M. Fiss, The Bureaucratization oftheJudiciary, 92 YALE L.J. 1442
(1983); JOSEPH VINING, THE AUTHORITATIVE AND THE AUTHORITARIAN 51-57
(1986); Rubin, supra note 30. See also, Reuben, supra note 52, at 56 (noting the
increased use of discovery referees in both state and federal courts); Kenneth R.
Feinberg, Creative Use ofADR: The Court-Appointed Special Settlement Master,
59 ALB. L. REV. 881 (1996) (discussing the burgeoning use of court-appointed
special settlement masters).
86 Fiss, supra note 85, at 1442; see also Vining, supra note 85, at 6; Rubin,
supra note 30.
See Fiss, supra note 85; Vining, supra note 85.
88See Vining, supra note 85; Rubin, supra note 30, at 653.
89See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 30, at 653 (suggesting that delegation to judicial
staff will "[i]n the long ran... lead to less respect for judicial decisions").
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resources.' Thus, for the company that does opt into the court system to
have its "day in court," it is likely to find itself entangled in the very form
of dispute resolution-ADR-that it sought to avoid from the beginning.
In California, it has reached the point where, ifthe court learns that the two
disputing businesses in a lawsuit have money and resources, they are
ordered into some form of ADR (usually mediation) and are thereby stalled
on the way to trial.91 Thus, even though business tax dollars help pay for
90 While court use and promotion of ADR was not unheard-of prior to the
1970s, the 1976 Pound Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with
the Courts (co-sponsored by Chief Justice Warren Burger, the Judicial Conference
of the United States, and the American Bar Association) was the first major push
to consider alternative ways to inexpensively and more efficiently obtain justice in
the courts. See G3riffi Bell, Improving the Administration ofJustice, NIDR FORUM,
Winter 1992, at 5; Deborah R. Hensler, A Glass HalfFull, a Glass HalfEmpty: The
Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal Injury Litigation, 73 TEX.
L. REV. 1587,1592 (1995) (commenting on the Pound Conference); R. William Ide
H, ADR: A Giant Step Toward the Future, DIsP. RESOL. J., Dec. 1993, at 20
(discussing the effects ofthe Pound Conference). Following the Pound Conference,
the use of ADR by courts has only accelerated. See Patrick Fn'Piere & Linda
Work, On the Growth and Development ofDispute Resolution, 81 KY. L.J. 959,
962-63 (1993) (discussing the growth and development of ADR in both the state
and federal courts). See also Rhonda McMillion, ExpandingADR Options, A.B.A.
J., June 1998, at 98 (noting that Congress has recently been urged to enact more
legislation to encourage the federal courts to make greater use of ADR).
91 This has been the authors' experience on numerous occasions in both
California's state and federal court systems. Even when the parties object to being
sent to voluntary or involuntary ADR, it often does little good. The courts usually
do not want to hear such objections. See also Stephen P. Younger, Effective
Representation of Corporate Clients in Mediation, 59 ALB. L. REV. 951, 951-52
(1995) ("With increasing frequency, our courts are encouraging litigants to use...
(ADR) procedures-such as mediation, early neutral evaluation, binding arbitration
and summary jury trial-to clear up overburdened court calendars."); William K.
Slate II, Arbitration Comes ofAge, AM. LAW., May 1995, at 8 ("[S]tate and federal
courts are now formally urging attorneys to turn to dispute resolution services for
cases that do not, per se, require a judge."); Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Court
Mediation and the Search for Justice Through Law, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 47 (1996)
("Within the last fifteen years, in both state and federal courts, litigants have often
been required to attend [an ADR] session before they will be allowed to be heard
by a judge."). Id. at 48-49 ("[C]ourts have shown increased interest in [ADR's]
potential as an official settlementprocess. As [ADR] programs are institutionalized
in court, litigants find themselves directed off their original course of seeking
justice through law."). Id. at 52; Judith S. Kaye, Business DisputeResolution-ADR
andBeyond: An Opening Statement, 59 ALB. L. REV. 835, 837-38 (1995) (noting
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the court system, courts have sent a clear message that such judicial welfare
is reserved for other types of cases; namely, criminal cases, family law
cases, civil rights cases, and the like. Again, while the impact of this
diversion process on our contemporary body of commercial law is difficult
to measure, we submit that it is more harmful than beneficial.
D. Vacatur, Selective Publication andNo-Citation Rules, Depublication,
and Filings Under Seal and Confidential Settlements
Another means that the courts have seized upon to address the
perceived workload problem has been to increase the use of vacatur,
selective publication, the adoption of no-citation rules, depublication,
filings under seal, and confidential settlements. As shown below, each of
these procedures is a form of "privatization '  that further "subtracts"93
from our body of commercial law.
1. Vacatur
One development that has recently become the subject ofrobust debate
is the increasing use ofvacatur, where, after a trial court reaches a decision
and issues a judgment, the parties reach a private settlement rather than
pursue further appeals. As a condition of their settlement, the parties
request that the appellate court vacate the lower court's prior judgment.94
that even "at the appellate level just about every state intermediate appellate court
and many federal appellate courts offer or require pre-argument submission to a
third-part neutral to narrow and settle civil appeals"); JerroldJ. Ganzfried, Bringing
Business Judgment toBusinessLitigation: Mediation and Settlement in the Federal
Court of Appeals, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 531 (1997) (noting the use and
promotion ofsettlementby federal appellate courts as partofthe appellate process).
92 For example, Judith Resnik notes that procedures like vacatur can be seen as
a "form of alternative dispute resolution." See Judith Resnik, Whose Judgment?
Vacating Judgments, Preferences for Settlement, and the Role ofAdjudication at
the Close of the Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1471, 1505 (1994)
[hereinafter Resnik, Whose Judgment?].
13 Slavitt, supra note 24, at 109 ("Our system of precedent has become
subtractive as well as additive. Like a sculpture, it is shaped as much by what is
removed as by what is added.").
94 A detailed discussion and analysis of vacatur is beyond the scope of this
Article. However, for a good presentation on vacatur, its history, usage rate,
advantages and disadvantages, scope, and the debate surrounding its use, see
Slavitt, supra note 24; Resnik, Whose Judgment?, supra note 92; Stephen R.
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Vacatur not only erodes the public's confidence in the courts,' but it also
prevents the use ofjudgments for collateral estoppel purposes, diminishes
the stare decisis value ofjudgments, and most importantly, alters the shape
and development of our business and commercial precedent.96
2. Selective Publication and the No-Citation Rule
The decision by many court systems to selectively publish certain
decisions is another form ofprivatization,97 largely motivated by workload
and shelf space concerns regarding the burgeoning quantity of case
decisions.9 But, as with vacatur, selective publication has resulted in a
Barnett, Making Decisions Disappear: Depublication and Stipulated Reversal in
the California Supreme Court, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1033 (1993); Henry E.
Klingeman, Settlement Pending Appeal: An Argument for Vacatur, 58 FORDHAM
L. REv. 233 (1989).
95 In Neary v. Regents ofthe University of California, Justice Joyce Kennard of
the California Supreme Court wrote in her dissent that "Public respect for the
courts is eroded when this court decides that a party who has litigated and lost in
the trial court can, by paying a sum of money sufficient to secure settlement
conditioned on reversal, purchase the nullification of the adversejudgment."Neary
v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 834 P.2d 119, 127 (Cal. 1992).
" See Slavitt, supra note 24, at 133-34. See also Resnik, Whose Judgment?,
supra note 92, at 1500.
[I]f one believes that an important purpose of litigation is to generate
information and law for the benefit of third parties and the public in general,
then objection should be made not only to the practice ofvacaturon consent
but also to the host of other procedural developments that promote
settlement and other forms of alternative dispute resolution less accessible
to the public than is adjudication.
Id. 97 Again, a detailed discussion and analysis of selective publication is beyond
the scope of this Article. However, for a presentation on selective publication, its
history, usage rate, advantages and disadvantages, scope, and the debate
surrounding its use, see Slavitt, supra note 24; Gerald F. Uelmen, Publication and
Depublication ofCalifornia Court ofAppeal Opinions: Is the Eraser Mightierthan
the Pencil?, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1007 (1993) [hereinafter Uelmen, Publication
and Depublication]; William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The Non-
Precedential Precedent-Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United
States Court ofAppeals, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1167 (1978).
" See generally Slavitt, supra note 24, at 123 ("[Jjudges do not have enough
time and resources to analyze, research, and write each opinion to the extent
necessary for it to become part of the system of published law."); Reynolds &
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significant loss of available contemporary cases to use as a guide in
resolving similar disputes." An additional concern raised by selective
publication is that a court, knowing that it is not going to certify a case to
be published, may not devote the same amount of energy to its decision."e
Richman, supra note 97, at 1183 n.95 (estimating that, based on records kept by
seven Third Circuit judges,judges spend approximately 30% of their time writing
opinions); Charles E. Carpenter, Jr., The No-Citation Rule for Unpublished
Opinions: Do the Ends of Expediency for Overloaded Appellate Courts Justify the
Means of Secrecy?, 50 S.C. L. REV. 235, 243, 249 (1998) (noting that "[tihe real
reason for [the selective publication and] no-citation rule is overload on the
appellate courts" and that "[flewer published decisions mean fewer volumes for
libraries to purchase").
" See Hinderks & Leben, supra note 15, at 158 (noting that over 60% of federal
circuit court decisions are not published); Gerald F. Uelmen, Losing Steam, CAL.
LAW., June 1990, at 33, 43 [hereinafter Uelmen, Losing Steam]; Philip L. Dubois,
The Negative Side of Judicial Decision Making: Depublication as a Tool of
Judicial Power and Administration on State Courts of a Last Resort, 33 VILL. L.
REV. 469, 488 (1988) (pointing out that less than 15% of appellate decisions in
California are certified for publication and of that fifteen percent, the California
Supreme Court orders an additional 10% depublished). Ironically, Judge Richard
Posner notes:
Despite the vast number of published opinions... judges will confess that
a surprising fraction of... appeals are difficult to decide, not because there
are too many precedents but because there are too few on point.
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRIsIs AND REFoRM 123 (1985)
(emphasis added). Similarly, Howard Slavitt writes:
Selective publication suppresses precedent that would help courts decide
future cases. In addition, even if selective publication saves time, it distorts
the shape of precedent. Lawyers use precedent to evaluate how courts apply
the law across a range of cases as much to identify what a precise rule of
law is. One cost of saving time, then, is that it leaves the law unclear and
may ultimately lead to more litigation to clarify the law. The long-term
costs of distortion, therefore, may outweigh any short-term efficiency of
savings .... By making the law more certain, it also allows individuals to
structure their affairs to avoid disputes and litigation.
Slavitt, supra note 24, at 126, 140 (footnotes omitted).
10o See Slavitt, supra note 24, at 123-24 (footnotes omitted). Slavitt states:
When a judge knows ahead of time that an opinion will not be published,
she can save time. First, the judge does not need to recite carefully the facts
of the case because the parties are already familiar with them. Second, it is
unnecessary to rehearse all of the arguments; the judge is able to focus the
opinion on the dispositive issues. Third, the judge need not spend as much
time eliminating vague language that other litigants may attempt to expand
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The selective publication problem is further aggravated by its sometime
companion, the no-citation rule.101 However, if unpublished opinions are
in later cases. Because unpublished opinions serve no future purpose,
judges need only provide a minimal indication of the reasoning that a fully
explicated opinion would have followed.
Id. See also Carpenter, supra note 98, at 251 (noting that "if judges know that their
opinions are not citable and that they will not have to sign the opinions, the same
'quality control' pressures will not be in place"). However, Anthony Kronman,
Dean of Yale Law School, strongly criticizes this shortcut
[O]pinion-writing disciplines the imagination. It is one thing to reach a
tentative conclusion in a case, but something very different to write an
opinion defending it. The search for the right words to support ajudgment
one has provisionally formed often stirs up new objections and compels the
reexamination of earlier beliefs. Ajudge may feel that he has decided a case
and is finished with it. But when he attempts to justify his decision in
writing, he will be forced to reenact the drama of the original conflict in his
imagination, taking first one side and then the other in an effort to
anticipate the strongest arguments that might be made against his own
earlier position and the best responses to them. Writing judicial opinions
imposes on the writer a duty of responsiveness that can be met only by
giving each side to a dispute its due, by entertaining every claim in its most
attractive light, and that in turn demands a special effort of imagination. The
discipline of opinion-writing is thus a goad to the imagination, and the
greater the distance of the writer from the original conflict in a case, the
more valuable this discipline becomes as a guard against the relaxation of
his imaginative powers: which is why it is especially needed at the appellate
level.
In many appellate courts, however, this discipline is weaker today than
it has been in the past. In part this is due to procedural changes in
court practice that permit more cases to be decided with no opinion or only
an unpublished one--changes intended to increase the number of disputes
that a court can decide in a given period of time. But a more important
cause of the weakening of this discipline has been the growing tendency of
appellate judges to work by editing draft opinions prepared for them by
their clerks instead of writing opinions themselves... [E]diting does not in
general make as strong a demand on the imagination as original
composition.
ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 330-31 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
1 See Carpenter, supra note 98, at 236. See generallyfHinderks & Leben, supra
note 15 (noting that no-citation rules are just what the name implies-they prohibit
the citation of unpublished opinions).
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to be treated in a manner consistent with the common law model, then they
should be citable as binding authority. 2
3. Depublication
Many higher appellate courts are now depublishing certain decisions
because they disagree with a lower court of appeal over a portion of its
reasoning. °3 As with vacatur and selective publication, depublication is
form of privatization that has resulted in a loss of available contemporary
cases to use as a guide in resolving similar disputes. For example, as earlier
noted, the California Supreme Court depublishes more appellate opinions
each year than it publishes opinions of its own; 44 further, less than fifteen
percent of appellate decisions in California are certified for publication,
and, of that fifteen percent, the California Supreme Court orders an
additional ten percent depublished.10s
11 See Carpenter, supra note 98, at 240 ("If unpublished opinions are to be
treated in the traditional common law fashion, then they constitute a source of the
first rank; that is, binding authority within the jurisdiction of the deciding court.
These unpublished opinions should be citable if they are binding authority.").
103 As with vacatur and selective publication, a detailed discussion and analysis
of depublication is beyond the scope of this Article. For a presentation on
depublication, its history, usage rate, advantages and disadvantages, scope, and the
debate surrounding its use, see Barnett, supra note 94; Dubois, supra note 99;
JosephR. Grodin, TheDepublication Practice ofthe California Supreme Court, 72
CAL. L. REv. 514 (1984); Slavitt, supra note 24; and Uelmen, Publication and
Depublication, supra note 97.
'"See Uelmen, Losing Steam, supra note 99, at 43-44.
11 See id. at 44; Dubois, supra note 99. Related to the vacatur, selective publi-
cation, no-citation, and depublication problems is the increased issuance of appel-
late decisions "without comment" and the decreased use of oral argument in
appellate cases. Both of these tactics distort precedent. See William C. Smith, Big
Objections to BriefDecisions, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1999, at 34, 36 (noting that "[l]ast
year, the federal appeals courts disposed of 25,020 appeals on the merits. About six
percent of the total were disposed of without comment, meaning the court did not
expound the law as applied in the case, or did not explain the reasons for the
ruling"); StephenR. Bamett, The Death of OralArgument, CAL. LAW., June 1990,
at 45, 46 (noting how the California Supreme Court votes on cases before oral
argument and "[b]y the time of oral argument, the shooting is all but over");
Carpenter, supra note 98, at 255 n.55 (noting the "increasingly frequent cases
where the court hears no oral argument and issues an unpublished opinion based
solely on the briefs").
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4. Filings Under Seal and Confidential Settlements
Typically, pretrial activity is not accessible to the public.' This is
certainly true with respect to most pretrial discovery. 7 Yet, in spite of this
fact, there is a "growing tendency" throughout the courts, "especially in
commercial cases, for litigants to agree to seal documents produced during
the discovery process as well as pleadings and exhibits filed with the
court"1 and to keep settlements confidential. 0 9 This tactic, however, not
only eliminates precedent, but also precludes third parties from obtaining
such information"0 and imposes substantial costs on future litigants who
may not know of the underlying wrong."' Or, even if these other litigants
are aware of the wrong, they must proceed to conduct expensive discovery
to prove once again that a wrong occurred."'
o See Resnik, Whose Judgment?, supra note 92, at 1493 n.84 ("Courts have
generally interpreted the common law... right of access to courts to apply, in civil
cases, [only] to pleadings, motions and the documents presented in support of
them, exhibits submitted at trial, and court transcripts of hearings, all of which are
presumptively open to the public."). See generally Arthur R. Miller,
Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 427 (1991).
07ee Resnik, Whose Judgment?, supra note 92, at 1493 n.85.
108 Nault's Auto Sales, Inc. v. American Honda Motor Co., 148 F.R.D. 25
(D.N.H. 1993) (criticizing the seemingly unchecked sealing of pleadings).
" Foran insightful account and discussion of this topic, see Ralph Nader's and
Wesley Smith's book "No Contest." NADER& SMITH, supra note 57, at 60-99. See
also John Gibeaut, Secret Justice, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1998, at 50; Resnik, Whose
Judgment?, supra note 92, at 1493-94.
11 Nader and Smith remind us that "information is power" and that "[i]n order
for people to make informed decisions about how they will conduct their lives,
about which products to purchase and which to avoid, about which companies to
patronize, and the like, they need access to information." NADER & SMITH, supra
note 57, at 61.
"' See, e.g., id. at 60-75.
.12 See, e.g., id.; Sunshine in Litigation Act: Hearing on S. 1404 Before the
Senate Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). Sybil Niden Goldrich, cofounder of
Command Trust Network (an organization that provides information to women
with breast implants), stated:
[T]he legal staffs of the manufacturers understood theirpower. They fought
using a strategy that required each plaintiff to reinvent the wheel. They
knew that an ailing woman could be coerced into unconscionable
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VI. THE INSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE OF LAW FURTHERING
THE PRIVATIZATION OF BusINEss DISPUTE RESOLUTION
We have highlighted the fact that, m order for commercial prece-
dent to develop and grow, business cases must enter (and remain m) the
court system, they must be tried and their records kept public, verdicts must
be rendered, appeals pursued, and appellate opinions published. Popular
perception would have us believe that today's lawyers are trying cases
and putting that process in motion."' However, this perception is not
the reality for the vast majority of today's litigators.1 14 Most cases are
resolved by negotiated settlements.1 5 Traditional litigation in the form of
a trial and appeal is the exception. 6 Professor Kevin McMunigal states
this perfectly-
The last two decades have seen a population explosion m the legal
profession, and much of the new manpower is employed exclusively m
work related to lawsuits. These lawyers are usually not trial lawyers. They
are called "litigators." Few of them have hadjury experience, and if they
participate in a bench trial it would be as "second chair" to a trial lawyer.
It is important to understand that the litigator is not simply a young lawyer
settlements. They fought until the cost of litigation increased to such a level
that lawyers had to capitulate.
Id. See also Brian T. FitzGerald, Sealed v. Sealed: A Public Court System Going
Secretly Pnvate, 6 . L. & POL. 381 (1989) (arguing against sealing).
"' To list a few examples from film and television: L.A. Law (NBC television
broadcast commencmg 1987); THE VERDICT (Twentieth Century Fox 1982); Ally
McBeal (Fox television broadcast commencing 1998); A FEW GOOD MEN
(Columbia 1993); KRAMERVS. KRAMER (Columbia 1979). Some book and novel
examples include: SCOTT TUROW, PRESUMED INNOCENT (1987); HARPER LEE, To
KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (1960); JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (1995); TOM
WOLFE, THE BONFIRE OF THE VANITIES (1987).
114 See CHARLES W WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGALETHICS at 593 (1986) ("Most
lawyers spend little time m courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire
practice without litigating a case. The dominance of litigation m the public mmd
reflects history, not present reality.").
"5 See Kevin C. McMumgal, The Costs of Settlement: The Impact ofScarcity
ofAdjudication onLitigatingLawyers, 37 UCLAL.REV 833,838-39 nn.15, 17-19
(1990) (and authorities cited therein).
16 See id., see also Klemer, supra note 6, at 90 ("Just a fraction of legal matters
are ultimately resolved in court.").
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acquiring experience that will equip him to start trying cases. Litigators
are now a separate specialty. There are many 50-year old litigators whose
trial experience has been negligible. They are highly regarded in their
specialty and conduct seminars attended by those who wish to improve
their own skills as litigators. And they are in charge of training the new
generation of litigators.
117
McMunigal continues:
[Unlike the discovery lawyer] [t]he experienced trial lawyer understands
the ultimate end of the discovery process. He knows that everything he
does is directed to the single goal of convincing the judge or jury. When
the experienced trial lawyer prepares a case, he never loses sight of the
fact that he is structuring the case for trial. In a sense, he is constantly
asking what do I need for the trial? how can I get it quickly? and how can
I get the information without helping or instructing my adversary? ....
All too often the discovery lawyer with little trial experience is
uncertain and lacks direction. This is particularly so in large cases where
the lawyer who prepares the case not only will not try it but may only be
familiar with one small aspect of the case. In such a case the discovery
tends to lack direction because the lawyer does not know where he is
going or why he's doing certain things. More depositions are taken than
needed. Witnesses are deposed who are not needed and who should not
have been deposed at all. Objections and evasions are frequent because
the discovery lawyer just isn't sure how the senior man will try the case
and doesn't want to be criticized for not protecting the client.
The lawyer's lack of trial experience causes him anxiety and
uncertainty. Because he is not confident all too often the tendency is to try
to insure that absolutely nothing is left uncovered. The discovery goes on
interminably as every conceivable stone is turned. The unfortunate result
is misused discovery, overdiscovery, expensive discovery, and at times,
harmful discovery."1 '
What is the reason for the advent of the "discovery lawyer?" Some
suggest that it is the result of the "procedural opportunities created by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.""' 9 It may also be due to the staffing
" 
7 McMunigal, supra note 115, at 840.
8 Id. at 870.
n9 Id. at 840. See also Resnik, Failing Faith, supra note 47, at 522 ("With the
new procedural opportunities [created by the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil
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needs of large-scale litigation. 2 ' Others suggest that the simultaneous
decline in trial rates and increase in the number of lawyers has led to this
new "specialty."' 2' However, we suggest an alternative reason: large
corporate law firms, their current structure and organization, and their
corresponding failure to properlytramin and mentortheirjunior attorneys for
trial work.'2
By way of background, in 1991, forty-seven percent of all lawyers in
private practice were in firms of twenty-one or more lawyers, including
thirty-three percent in firms of fifty-one or more lawyers.'2 Today this
figure is undoubtedly higher. 4 This is not to say that the influence of
Procedure] came a new set of lawyers, 'litigators,' who did their work (motions,
depositions and interrogatory practice) during the pretrial process and who were to
be distinguished from 'trial lawyers,' who actually conducted trials."). See
generally Jonathan T. Molot, How Changes in the Legal Profession Reflect
Changes in Civil Procedure, 84 VA. L. REV. 955 (1998).
120 See McMunigal, supra note 115, at 841 n.23. McMunigal notes:
Large scale, massive, multi-party litigation frequently involves extremely
complex and detailed factual disputes. Such cases have spawned a
generation of lawyers who have spent years engaged in reviewing
documents, litigation motions about the scope of discovery and answering
interrogatories. These discovery lawyers know the ins and outs of the
Federal Rules of Discovery. But these discovery lawyers seldom try cases
and, unfortunately, often do not know how to try a case effectively. Their
skills are not the skills of the experienced trial lawyer.
Id.
121 See id. at 853-55 and accompanying notes.
For an excellent discussion on the arrival, growth and transformation of the
large corporate law firm, see MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT
OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM (1991); KRONMAN,
supra note 100, at 271-314. See also LINCOLN CAPLAN, SKADDEN: POWER,
MONEY, AND THE RISE OF A LEGAL EMPIRE (1993) (detailing the history,
development and rise to power of the Skadden law firm in New York).
2 See BARBARAA. CURRAN&CLARAN. CARSON, THE LAWYER STATISTICAL
REPORT: THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE 1990s 8 (1994). See also ROBERT
GRANFIELD, MAKING ELITE LAWYERS 5 (1992) (reporting that half of UCLA Law
School graduates in 1986 entered law firms employing more than 50 lawyers and
that 14% of law school graduates entering private practice in 1987 did so with
firms of 100 or more attorneys); GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 122, at 46
(tracing the growth in large law firms from the 1950s to the 1990s).
" See Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, LegalEducation andEntry
Into the Legal Profession: The Role of Race, Gender, and Educational Debt, 70
N.Y.U.L.REV. 829,839 (1995) (noting that in the practice oflaw "there [has been]
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smaller law firms and solo practitioners on our body of commercial law is
insignificant. Nonetheless, the reality is large corporate law firms handle
the majority of legal work for most (if not all) major U.S. companies, and
they exercise power and influence well beyond their numerical strength.
Anthony Kronman points out:
[T]hese firms are elite institutions. They attract the best law school
graduates, have the most powerful clients, and possess the greatest clout
within the profession. They also make the most money. As a result, they
exert a disproportionate influence on the practicing bar as a whole. Any
basic change in the culture of the corporate firm, such as has occurred in
the last twenty years, is therefore certain to have repercussions far beyond
these firms themselves and to be felt in some measure by all those that
stand below them in the hierarchy of power and prestige.
.... [T]he large corporate firm continues to exercise an influence,
both within the profession and outside it, that far exceeds its numerical
strength.12
5
In the past, the mentoring and training of junior lawyers to become
skilled trial attorneys was an important part of the institutional
structure of these firms.2 6 Today that is no longer the case. Despite
their claims to the contrary,12 7 they have become driven by the "bottom
a marked shift to practice in larger settings"); Barbara A. Curran, American
Lawyers in the 1980s: A Profession in Transition, 20 L. & Soc'Y REv. 19 (1986)
(indicating that lawyer demographics show an increasing trend of lawyer
employment in group settings and a decline in solo practice).
'25 KRONMAN, supra note 100, at 272-73. See also Bryant G. Garth, Legal
Education andLargeLawFirms: DeliveringLegality orSolvingProblems, 64 IND.
L.J. 433, 433 (1989) ("Large law firms are the most successful institutional
component of the American legal profession according to the criteria of economic
prosperity, proximity to the corridors of economic and political power, and the
influence exerted on the legal profession generally.").
"
6 For an excellent example, see Patrick .Schiltz, LegalEthics in Decline: The
Elite Law Firm, the Elite Law School, and the Moral Formation of the Novice
Attorney, 82 MINN. L. REV. 705, 720-22 (1997) (detailing the mentoring and
training Professor Schlitz received at his firm as a young attorney).
127 See, e.g., CAPLAN, supra note 122, at 191-206 (suggesting that the Skadden
firm's various pro bono activities, while touted as a way to give back to the
community and provide legal training, were in reality a strategy by the firm to
enhance its public image and thereby increase profits).
[VOL. 88
PRIVATIZATION OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
line."'2 The effective mentoring and training of their junior attorneys is no
longer a priority.12
9
This development has manifested itself in a variety of ways, each of
which has contributed to (and continues to contribute to) the advent of a
generation of discovery lawyers who do not know how to try a business
case. For example, the compensation of partners in these firms (and
decisions about who makes partner) focuses almost exclusively on the
business and revenue that the partner generates.3 0 The partner who brings
in business and is able to keep as many associates as possible busy in his
or her practice group can expect to be handsomely rewarded by the firm.
The partner who takes a daily hands-on approach to the legal work of a
business client and uses that process to train and mentor the firm's junior
lawyers is unlikely to fare as well.' The impact of this management
"2 See John J. Curtin, Jr., Civil Matters, A.BA. J., Aug. 1991, at 8 ("The law
is edging ever closer to being a business rather than a profession, a development
which emphasizes the bottom line above all other concerns."); GALANTER &
PALAY, supra note 122, at 2-3 ("[Although] laments about commercialization and
the loss of professional virtue have recurred regularly for a centry... there is
something different this time around. The present 'crisis' is the real thing.")
(footnote omitted); GLENDON, supra note 1, at 6 (noting the increasing prevalence
of the view "that law is a business like any other; and that business is just the
unrestrained pursuit of self-interest"); Carl T. Bogus, The Death ofan Honorable
Profession, 71 IND. L.J. 911, 913 (1996) ("[T]he practice of law is suffering from
increased commercialization."); NADER& SMITH, supra note 57, at 233 ("[M]oney
seems to drive the corporate legal culture, creating a bottom-line mentality under
which what is best for the financial interests of the law firm is confused with what
is best for the legal needs of the client.").
12 See Schiltz, supra note 126, at 739-46. See also Debra Baker, Cash-and-
CarrjAssociates, A.B.A. J., May 1999, at 40-44 (detailing the lack of mentoring
and training for today'sjunior litigators). In the March 1989 issue of the California
Lawyer, itwas reported that many California firms are using outside consultants for
training in trial skills. See Paul D. Freeman, Teach theAssociates Well, CAL. LAW.,
Mar. 1989, at 77. However, McMunigal suggests that while the articulated reason
for using such consultants is "efficiency," an alternative explanation may be that
even thepartners in today's law firms lack the necessary trial skills to provide such
training. McMunigal, supra note 115, at 852 n.82. See also NADER & SMITH,supra
note 57, at 251 ('Partners will not 'waste time' training associates because it takes
away from billable work. That leads to an atmosphere where money is the most
important thing.").
130 See, e.g., GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 122, at 52-53.
... In working for and litigating against large corporate law firms, the authors
have seen many such examples. Interestingly, there are even cold, calculating
1999-20001
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
philosophy and institutional structure onmentoringandtrainingis obvious.
Second, the associates in these firms are under tremendous pressure to bill
hours'32 and at the same time bring in new business.133 They are also
expected to hit the ground running to justify their high starting saaries. 34
There is, quite simply, no time for junior attorneys to be mentored and
trained in a personal, deliberative, and thoughtful way. Third, the increased
lateral movement of attorneys has caused many corporate law firms to view
junior attorneys as "dispensable worker bees" rather than someone they
should invest in and train to become quality trial lawyers. 135 Finally, in an
intensely competitive legal environment, many corporate law firms will not
hesitate to try and lure clients away from competing firms; 136 and time that
mathematical formulas that such firms use to measure profitability and
performance. See, e.g., Ward Bower, Practice Management and Profitability
(visited Jan. 2,2000) <http://www.altmanweil.com/publications/articles/economic_
financial_managementlefin3a.htm> (located on the website of Altman Well, Inc.,
a global consulting firm to the legal profession). This web page contains a report
listing and discussing a formula that measures law firm profitability based upon
such factors as the ratio of associates to partners, the "blended" hourly billing rate,
the number of client hours recorded, etc.
'
32 See Schlitz, supra note 126, at 739-740. See also Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Culture Clash in the Quality of Life in the Law: Changes in the Economics,
Diversification and Organization ofLawyering, 44 CASEW.RES. L.REv. 621,629-
34 (1994) (discussing the large corporate law firm, and in particular its increased
emphasis on "billable hours"); Terry Carter, Superstars or Falling Stars?, A.B.A.
J., Aug. 1998, at 28 (putting.the current billable hour "gold standard" at corporate
law firms at 2400 hours per year); KRONMAN, supra note 100, at 281 (noting that
many large firms "operate around-the-clock with a twenty four hour secretarial
staff"); NADER & SMITH, supra note 57, at 235 ("Corporate attorneys in big firms
'are under intense pressure to bill as many hours as possible and are strongly
motivated to maximize their hours by fair means or foul."').
As McMunigal notes, such an institutional structure "may create pressures for
lawyers to file meritless cases to generate hourly fee work in discovery and motion
practice." McMunigal, supra note 115, at 864. He also notes that pretrial
maneuvering, including discovery, has now become the "main event" in many
lawsuits. Id. at 869.
131 See Schlitz, supra note 126, at 741; NADER & SMITH, supra note 57, at 251
("Often, the lawyers who made partner weren't the skilled professionals but the
best rainmakers, who know how to bill and work a cocktail hour to garner
clients.").
134 See Schlitz, supra note 126, at 743.
... See id. at 744.
136 See id. at 741.
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a lawyer spends courting a competitor's client decreases the number of
hours in a day available for providing or receiving mentoring and training.
Unfortunately, this focus and institutional structure distorts our system
of commercial precedent. Among other things, the discovery lawyers that
these firms grow and produce undoubtedly increase litigation expense,
13 7
which in turn probably causes some businesses to flee the public court
system and turn to private ADR to resolve their disputes. Further, because
many discovery lawyers lack confidence in their trial skills, they may
consciously (or subconsciously) seek out private ADR in order to minimize
their own stress or embarrassment. 3 For the few discovery lawyers that do
actually endup trying a business case, it is not uncommon to see a polluted
trial court record subsequently presented to the court of appeal,1 39 thereby
137See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text quote by Professor Mc-
Munigal.
'
31 See McMunigal, supra note 115, at 873. McMunigal notes:
One frequently voiced claim for settlement is that the processes which lead
to it take less of a psychological and emotional toll on the parties to [the]
litigation. If this is true, then perhaps settlement may take less of a
psychological and emotional toll on lawyers as well. Some litigators
complain that their professional lives are consumed by conflict and
negativism, that litigation is, at heart, a relentlessly destructive enterprise,
dominated by efforts to find and exploit vulnerabilities in others, while
tenaciously warding off similarly driven efforts by opponents. The pursuit
of reasonable grounds for settlement can offer litigators a break from all
this.
Id. McMunigal furthermore makes the point that when the number of civil trials
declines, litigators' advocacy skills atrophy. This degeneration process in turn
distorts not only the trial skills oflitigators, but also the settlement process. In other
words, litigators without adequate trial experience are less able to accurately
evaluate cases and are more likely to settle out of fear of their own inadequacy. See
id. at 855-62; see also G. Thomas Eisele, The Case Against Mandatory Court-
Annexed ADR Programs, 75 JUDICATURE 34,40 (June-July 1991) (Judge Eisele
notes that "lawyers with limited trial skills will ordinarily prefer a procedure that
is less demanding.").
139 See Warren E. Burger, Some Further Reflections on the Problem of
Adequacy of Trial Counsel, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 1 (1980) ("[A] broad
consensus has now emerged that a significant problem concerning the quality of
a substantial number of lawyers' performances in the trial courts does indeed
exist."); Malcom Richard Wilkey, A Bar Examination for Federal Courts, 61
A.B.A. J. 1091,1091 (1975) (commenting on the "inability ofa startlingpercentage
of lawyers to try a lawsuit); Rubin, supra note 30, at 649 ("Today appeals involve
records of thousands of pages and briefs arguing dozens of issues.").
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perhaps leaving an appellate court with no choice but to use the privatiza-
tion tools of selective publication and depublication.
VII. ADDITIONAL DANGERS POSED BY THE PRIVATIZATION PROCESS
Any mechanism that privatizes the resolution of business disputes
thwarts our system of precedent and will have a significant impact on the
business community and our society. But has the business community,
those governing and advising them, or the judiciary, honestly, intelligently,
and fairly evaluated and weighed the benefits of this privatization process
against the harms? We submit that the answer is no. In addition to stunting
the growth of our commercial precedent, the following are additional
dangers presented by these privatization processes.
A. The Loss ofInformation and Reduction of the Public Welfare
As previously noted, one of the attractive features of private ADR is
that certain things can remain private and confidential." However, this
results in a significant amount of information that is difficult to track and
lost to the public. 141 Further, to the extent that public disclosures are made
during the privatized process, they are often not tracked, memorialized and
stored. 42 There is already a scarcity of data and information available to
scholars who study private ADR and the court system. 43 The privatization
of business disputes only adds an additional layer of fog that makes the
meaningful study and analysis of such issues all the more difficult.
Moreover, if we are serious and sincere about protecting the public
welfare, much of the information that is normally hidden by private ADR
should be made available to the public. Take, for example, Whirlpool
Corporation who, several years ago, entered into an agreement with State
Farm Fire and Casualty Company that "established the process for
resolving State Farm's subrogation claims against Whirlpool arising out of
products sold by Whirlpool which allegedly caused property damage to
" See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
141 See Edward Brunet, Questioning the Qualitjp ofAlternateDisputeResolution,
62 TUL. L. REV. 1, 13 (1987); Kevin F- Casey, Alternate Dispute Resolution and
Patent Law, 3 FED. CIRCUrr B.J. 1, 5 (1993).
14 See, e.g., Borzou Daragahi, Environmental ADR: Demandfor Arbitration
Raises Practical Concerns, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 8, 1994, at 5; Schroder, supra note 64,
at C14.
143 See supra note 52.
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State Farm's insureds."'" Whirlpool and State Farm agreed to remove all
disputes from the public court system and resolve their disputes pursuant
to mediation and arbitration.'45 The companies streamlined discovery rules
and eliminated outside lawyers from the process. 46 The proceedings and
all decisions were kept confidential, and thereby inaccessible to the
plaintiff s bar.47
This arrangement is undoubtedly of great value and benefit to
Whirlpool and State Farm. Nevertheless, there are compeliing reasons why
such agreements violate public policy and such information should be
revealed. In a typical products liability lawsuit, for example, the negative
effects of a product may not yet be known to the general public.148 At least
in the court system, certain procedures must be followed before documents
containing such vital information can be sealed.149 Also, if the need later
arises and an adequate showing is made, such documents can be later
unsealed for the public's perusal. 50 Such institutional protections are
completely lacking in the world of private ADR. Arthur Bryant of Trial
Lawyers for Public Justice hits the mark on this important point:
[S]ecrecy subverts democracy itself.
Every day the papers are filled with disputes over whether our civil
rights, securities, antitrust, product liability, environmental and other laws
need to be changed. Wouldn't it be great if, in order to decide these and
similar questions, the public, Congress and the president could actually
know the facts?'
" Robert T. Kenagy, Whirlpool's Search for Efficient and Effective Dispute
Resolutions, 59 ALB. L. REV. 895, 897 (1995).
145 See id. at 898.
'" See id.
147 See id.
141 See generally Edward I. Higgins, Gone But Not Forgotten: Manufacturers'
Post-Sale Duties to Warn of Recall, 78 MICH. B.J. 570, 571 (1999) (discussing
manufacturers' continuing duty to warn consumers about dangerous defects in
products discovered after the product is placed into the stream of commerce).
'
49 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV.P. 26(c)(6)-(7) (trade secret material can be sealed "for
good cause" as "justice requires"). See generally Gibeaut, supra note 109.
150 See 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2044.1 (2d ed. 1994) ("Modification of Protective Orders"). See generally
Gibeaut, supra note 109.
'51 Arthur H. Bryant, Letters, A.B.A. 1., June 1998, at 10.
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B. Widening the Gap Between the "Haves" and "Have-Nots"
The publicly-supported judicial system has, at least as one of its
announced goals, the desire to bridge gaps in resources between the parties
and ensure that the proceeding is conducted on a level playing field.' 52 A
good judge will often look out for the party who may be outmatched by a
better funded or more talented opponent. If, for example, a young attorney
is having difficulty properly framing an important question to a witness
during a trial, it is not uncommon for the judge to suggest a more appropri-
ate question to ask.1 53 But with private ADR, the participants receive
something very different. Thirdparty neutrals do not normally assume such
a protective role, especially if they were selected from an industry panel.'15
Many sophisticated businesses and their corporate counsel know this fact
and seek to use it to their advantage, primarily through mandatory
152 See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR
THE FEDERAL COURTS 71 (1995). It states:
Private forums should be encouraged, but the federal courts must not shed
their obligation to provide public forums for disputes that need qualities that
federal courts have traditionally provided, including at a minimum a neutral
and competent decision-maker and the protection of weaker parties' access
to information and power to negotiate a dispute.
See also Fiss, supra note 6, at 1077 ("We count, however, on the guiding presence
of the judge, who can employ a number of measures to lessen the impact of
distributional inequalities [between the parties].").
153 Both authors have witnessed such assistance by judges in business cases at
both the state and federal level.
" See Peter F. Blackman, Arbitration SuitAsserts ConstitutionalArguments,
NAT'L L.J., Feb. 27, 1995, at B1, B2; Richard C. Rueben, ReformingADR, CAL.
LAW., Feb. 1998, at 31; and Michele Marcucci, Freeing ADR, CAL. LAW., Feb.
1998, at 29,70-75. Other areas of concern with respect to private ADR are the lack
of an adequate record, the unchecked power of arbitrators, and the difficulty in
challenging an arbitration award. See Bird v. Shearson Lehman/Am. Express, Inc.,
926 F.2d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 1991) (Kearse, J., dissenting). Judge Kearse noted
that AAA's commercial arbitration rules only require the arbitrator to put his or her
award in writing, not to provide an explanation for the decision.
In 1988 congressional hearings on arbitration reform, a securities industry
spokesman noted that arbitrators in the industry are regarded as being free
to grant or deny awards without complying with applicable legal standards
*.. [The] arbitrators frequently made decisions that did not reflect legal
standards but rather sought to do rough justice.
Id. at 124 (citation omitted).
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arbitration clauses.15 In short, while private ADR is no doubt appropriate
for certain disputes, we should not allow it to become a corporate tool for
further widening the gap between the "haves" and "have-nots" in busi-
ness.
15 6
C. A Reduction in the Power of the Courts
Courts, like any institution, can only function properly if they have the
respect and support ofthe people. However, as businesses make increasing
use of private ADR, only certain types of cases may be left in the court
system-namely, criminal, familylaw, civil rights, inpro per cases, andthe
like-thereby reducing the overall power ofthe courts in our society.5 7 Are
"I The securities industry is notorious for doing this. In the past it has supported
the system of specialist arbitration and even subsidized the cost of arbitration. See
Susan Antilla, Brokerage Firms Steer Dissatisfied Customers Away From Court,
but in Only One Direction, N.Y. TIMEs, May 12, 1995, at A29. According to one
observer, "Christians had abetter chance against the lions than many investors and
employees will have in the climate being created now." Margaret A. Jacobs &
Michael Siconolfi, Losing Battles: Investors Fare Poorly Fighting Wall
Street-And May Do Worse, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 1995, at Al. See also Barbara
Presley Noble, At Work: Attacking Compulsory Arbitration, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 15,
1995, at F21.
Those with grievances and their representatives say the industry picks its
arbitrators from a Wall Street 'old boy' network that is especially unlikely
to look favorably on discrimination claims, requires little-to-no knowledge
of employment law, conducts its operations in secret and explicitly tells its
mediators they neither have to follow the law nor explain their decisions.
Id.
'
56 See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come OutAhead: Speculations on the
Limits ofLegal Change, 9 L. & SOc'Y REV. 96 (1974) (comparing the structural
advantages of institutional litigants, or "repeat players," to "one-shot" litigants).
Galanter notes that institutional litigants are typically those organizations that: (1)
engage in frequent litigation; (2) are more concerned with long-range goals than
with the outcome of a particular case; and (3) have the political and economic
resources necessary to support their larger interests. See id. at 97-104. Galanter and
others also note that businesses are the classic "repeat players" in the legal system
and as such, are able to use their experience as "repeat players" to their advantage.
See id.; see also Nancy H. Rodgers & Craig A. McEwen, Employing the Law to
Increase the Use ofMediation and to Encourage Direct and Early Negotiations,
13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 831, 839 (1998).
117 See David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion ofthe Public Realm, 83 GEO.
L.J. 2619, 2625 (1995).
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we moving toward a society in which businesses with money make use of
private ADR15 1 while others are "consigned to public courts which
government will have little incentive to adequately fund because their
constituents lack political clout"? 59 Will the courts suffer the same fate as
the public school system? 6° Perhaps. Thus, the following admonition by
Justice Moses Harrison of the Illinois Supreme Court should be kept in
mind:
Generally speaking, I'm opposed to dispute resolution and mediation. I
know that we need some means to dispose of cases, but I don't believe
that sitting around trying to talk things over is an adequate substitute for
formal proceedings governed by rules of evidence and presided over by
an experienced judge. Our current system is the culmination of centuries
of experience, experience which has shown that without rules of evidence,
real justice is difficult to achieve. [ADR] may make... statistics look
good, but good statistics don't necessarily reflect an improvement. After
all, Mussolini made the trains run on time in Italy, but so what? He had
to turn his country into a fascist state to do it. Mediation and alternative
dispute resolution proposals are seductive because they promise to reduce
costs, but they are dangerous because they are also a means for reducing
the power of the courts. These proposals are in direct competition with
Whenever disputants rely on the final and public judgment of a court to
resolve their controversy, they enhance the court's claim as an authoritative
resolver of controversies. However, when disputants turn elsewhere for
resolution-private arbitration, nonjudicial government agencies, orprivate
bargaining-the salience of adjudication fades and the authority of courts
weakens.
Id. See also Lauren K. Robel, Private Justice and the Federal Bench, 68 IND. L.J.
891, 894 (1993) (contending that the increased use of private justice by litigants
undermines the authority of the federal courts).
"' See, e.g., Reuben, supra note 52, at 55 (noting that fees charged by JAMS
rent-a-judges range from $350 to $500 per hour). Presumably, only wealthy
businesses and litigants can afford such rates, thereby creating a two-tier system of
justice--one for the "haves" and another for the "have-nots."
59 Robert L. Haig & Steven P. Caley, How Clients Can Use Federal CourtADR
Methods to Achieve Better Results, 5 FED. LrriG. GUIDE REP. 193, 194 (1994).
"6o See James Podgers, Chasing the Ideal: As More Americans Find Themselves
Priced Out of the System, the Struggle Goes on to Fulfill the Promise of Equal
Justice for All, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1994, at 56, 61 (analogizing the harm to public
education due to loss of public support to the potential harm to the public court
system if the big players exit the system for private ADR).
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our court system. Indeed, they threaten to destroy the very system that is
the very basis of our profession. They undermine the judiciary by
diverting scarce resources away from the courts and by placing the
process under the control of people who do not know and have no reason
to know any law or rules of evidence. The result, I believe, will be a cut-
rate brand of rough justice that is neither fair nor consistent, but merely
cheap. 16'
VIII. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
The continued vitality and utility of a contemporary body of commer-
cial common law which is based upon courts' experiences with similar
business cases, and the continuing evolution of rules to govern business
conduct, requires two things: (1) that there be a substantial pool of business
cases processed and decided by our public court system; and (2) that the
decisions in those cases be available as precedent and become part of the
evolving framework for governing and deciding business and commercial
disputes. To ensure that these two things can occur, we propose that the
following course corrections be made.
A. Course Corrections to Help Maintain a Sufficient Quantity and Variety
ofBusiness Cases at the Trial Court Level
If the common law is to continue to provide contemporary standards
for allocating risk and decidingbusiness and commercial disputes, the court
system must be able to attract and process a large number and variety of
business cases. Only with a sufficient number and variety of cases can the
system operate to fine-tune itself by recognizing patterns of commercial
practice and developing common law responses to recurring problems. 162
161 Justice Moses Harrison, KeynoteAddress atthe 1996 Illinois Supreme Court
dinner (1996), quoted in LUCILLE M. PONTE & THOMAs D. CAVENAGH,
ALTERNATIVEDISPUTERESOLUTIONINBusINESS 329-30 (1999). Charles Carpenter
also notes that with respect to the issue of selective publication and no-citation
rules, they "add to [a hostile perception of the courts] by increasing the aura of
secrecy over the functioning of the judicial branch and by strengthening the
perception that the judiciary is not accountable." Carpenter, supra note 98, at 254.
1 We know, for example, that only a fraction of cases are resolved by trial.
See, e.g., supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text. Thus, if we assume that 95%
of all business cases are settled or otherwise disposed of before trial, and if, of the
remaining five percent, half (or more) are denied precedential value due to
selective publication, vacatur, or depublication, then by the end of the process few
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The past two decades have seen a number of initiatives, at both the
federal and state levels, to improve and reform the court system's
processing of cases. Conscious of the fact that "[j]ustice delayed is justice
denied,"163 many of these reform initiatives, and the majority of those
actually implemented, single out and attempt to address the issue of delay.
These initiatives have included the so-called "rocket docket" and "fast
track" programs, 64 judicial management of cases, 165 structural consolida-
tion initiatives, 1" closer monitoring and evaluation of the time it takes
courts and judges to dispose of cases on their docket,167 court-annexed
arbitration, 68 summary jury trials,169 and the restriction of diversity
cases remain with which to grow and develop our contemporary body of
commercial common law in a meaningful way.163 John K. Van de Kamp & Richard Jacobs, Reducing Time to Trial: The Trial
Court Delay Reduction Act of.1986, 1 CAL. LIn. 9, 9 (1987); see also Johnson,
supra note 34, at 230 ("The notion that justice delayed is justice denied has
repeatedly been recognized and confirmed.").
16 See Johnson, supra note 34, at 235-37 (discussing the proliferation ofrocket
docket programs); Friedrichs, supra note 34, at 445-54 (discussing one of
California's many fast track programs in San Diego County).
See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
See Joan B. Carey, Court Reform: Consolidation ofthe State's Courts: Judge
Kaye's Proposal, 4 CITY LAW 25 (MarJApr. 1998) (describing the court consolida-
tion movement inNew York's state courts); David Kline, George Hails Overwhelm-
ing Passage of Court Consolidation Measure, METROPOLITAN NEWS-ENTERPRISE,
June 4, 1998, at 3 (describing the court consolidation movement in California's state
courts); see, e.g., Renee Deger, In Brief, RECORDER, Aug. 3, 1998 (same).
67 Seesupra note 84. See also STATE OF CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL
PERFORMANCE ANNUAL REPORT 17 (1998) (noting that in 1998 eleven judges
received an advisory letter or discipline for decisional delay, tardiness, or other
dereliction of duty); A. John Pelander, Judicial Performance Review in Arizona:
Goals, Practical Effects and Concerns, 30 ARIz. ST. L. J. 643, 645, 651 (1998)
(noting that over the past two decades the concept of evaluating judicial
performance-which includes managerial skills andpunctuality-hasbeen adopted
in a number ofjurisdictions and that there is a growing trend in that direction); Jona
Goldschmidt, Merit Selection: Current Status, Procedures, and Issues, 49 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1, 18 (1994) (noting the recommendation that judicial performance
commissions develop judicial evaluations based on criteria such as docket
management and prompt case disposition).
168 See Irving R. Kaufman, Reform for a System in Crisis: Alternative Dispute
Resolution in theFederal Courts, 59 FoRDHAML.REv. 1,17-22 (1990) (describing
court-annexed arbitration).
169 See id. at 13-17 (describing the summary jury trial); Ponte, supra note 45,
at 1069-84.
(VOL. 88
PRIVATIZATION OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
jurisdiction.70 A number of other reforms have appeared, ranging from
specialized business courts,"' greater uniformity of laws governing choice
of law and choice of forum to increase standardization and comity,
I7
reduced discovery," and limitations on trial byjury.7 However, the extent
to which such reforms address and improve the viability and attractiveness
of the court system as a forum of choice for business cases remains unclear.
It is widely perceived that many judges lack the background, familiar-
ity, and training in business and commercial practice. 5 This in part is due
to the increased specialization of the law itself,7 6 the politicization of
judicial selection,'" and even to judicial salaries.?7 Today, many trial court
judges, at both the state and federal levels, are promoted from positions in
170 Effective in 1997, Congress increased the jurisdictional amount for diversity
cases from $50,000 to $75,000. See John Flynn Rooney, U.S. Jurisdiction Limit
Increases to $75,000, Cm. DAILY LAW BULL., Jan. 16, 1997, at 1. See also 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (1999).
"I See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Forums of the Future: The Role of Specialized
Courts inResolvingBusinessDisputes, 61 BROOK. L.REV. 1 (1995) (discussing the
trend toward adjudicating business disputes in specialized tribunals). But for a
countervailing view of the merits of specialized business courts, see Jeffrey W.
Stempel, Two Che.ersfor Specialization, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 67 (1995).
17 See generally KENNETH W. CLARKSON ET AL., WEST'S BusiNEsS LAW 477-
78 (1992) (discussion illustrating the wide latitude that courts now give to forum
selection and choice of law clauses); SCHAFFER ET AL., supra note 25, at 111
(same). Further, state adoption ofsection 1-105 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
which provides that parties may chose the law that will govern the contract so long
as their choice bears a "reasonable relation" to the selected state, was obviously an
important step toward increasing uniformity and comity in the choice of law area.
See U.C.C. § 1-105 (1995).
" See Eric K. Yamamoto, ADR: Where Have the Critics Gone?, 36 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 1055, 1057 (1996) (noting reduced discovery as a reform measure
designed to reduce court caseloads and address criticism about waste and delay).
74 See, e.g., RobertW. Phillips, Note, Cass CountyMusic Co. v. C.H.L.R., Inc.:
Law, Equity, and the Right to Jury Trial in Copyright Infringement Suits Seeking
Statutory Damages, 51 ARK. L. REV. 117, 121 (1998) (noting that the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals has held there is a right to a jury trial on both the issues
of infringement and the determination of the amount oft "basic" statutory damages
award, while other circuit courts of appeals have adopted a conflicting view).75 See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
176 See, e.g., KRONMAN, supra note 100, at 275 (noting how the law has become
"more specialized").
' See supra note 61.
'7 See supra note 62.
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prosecutorial offices of district attorneys and U.S. attorneys. 79 Many of
these judges come to the bench without any significant experience in
business or commercial practice, other than a first year contracts course,
and perhaps a commercial or secured transactions course. This lack of
familiarity with ordinary and standard commercial and business practices
is communicated to the business parties in the courtroom, contributing to
a loss of confidence in the court's ability to understand the commercial
subject matter itself.180
Even when judges are not selected from a criminal prosecution or
defense background, they have often had little, if any, actual trial experi-
ence. As discussed previously with respect to the so-called "discovery
lawyer" problem,' attorneys (and judges) who have not actually tried
cases and introduced evidence tend to be "discovery lawyers," and they
remain less than comfortable with the actual conduct of trials and the
resolution of evidentiary issues. Further, existing continuing education
programs for judges have not, for the most part, focused on increasing
familiarity with commercial and business practices, although some of the
educational programs are aimed at improving trial and evidence skills.'82
"I For example, with respect to U.S. district court judges, 40.7% of President
Clinton's appointees came from a prosecutorial background. For Presidents Bush,
Reagan and Carter, the figures are 39.2%, 44.1%, and 38.1%, respectively. See
Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 61, at 275 tbl. 3.
180 When we say, "communicated in the courtroom," the following is an
example that the authors have experienced in many of California's state and federal
courts: Due to the complexity of most business cases, a two, three or even four-
week trial is not uncommon. When the court learns that the case will take that long
to try, statements to the effect of, "Three weeks! We don't have that kind of time,
staff or resources in this building to devote to your case" are not unheard-of. When
counsel resists efforts to be diverted into arbitration or mediation and insists on a
trial, he or she will often quickly find their case has become a member of a
disfavored class. In other words, you pay for your insistence through delay; the
court will put your case at the back of the line. Moreover, when the trial finally
takes place, the judge's or court personnel's frustration with having to try the case
is usually somehow communicated to the jury.
I" See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
1 A review of the National Center for State Courts' Course Calendarweb page,
Year 2000 Course Calendar (visited Jan. 3, 2000) <http://www.ncsc.dni.us/icm/
2000cat/icm2000.htm>, and the Federal Judicial Center's Education L.C.W. web
page, Education Materials for Court Personnel (visited Jan. 3, 2000)
<http://www.fjc.gov/public/fjcweb.nsf/Pages/54>, reveals a wide variety of con-
tinuing education courses for judges to hone their skills, only a handful of which
appear to touch on business and commercial cases and issues.
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A closely related issue is that many trial judges, particularly at the state
court level, simply are not provided adequate time and staffto address and
research issues of law that arise in business and commercial cases.'
Finally, there is a perception among many of those representing businesses
before state and federal courts that many of the best "business" judges
leave the judiciary to either return to private practice, or to enter into the
private judging market.'84 This "robe drain" results in a further loss of
familiarity and expertise in business subjects on our benches.
1. Recommendation One-
Expand the Pool ofJudicial Candidates
Bar associations, especially business law sections, andbusiness groups
should encourage appointing authorities, or where judges are elected,
voters, to expand the candidate pool and appoint or elect judges who have
actually practiced in the business transaction or litigation fields prior to
assuming the bench. Former prosecutors do not necessarily make good
business and commercial dispute resolution judges.
2. Recommendation Two-
Improve Judicial Continuing Education in
Business and Commercial Practices
Judges should be better exposed, through a regular curriculum of
continuing education courses, to evolving business and commercial
practices. For those judges who have not had extensive trial experience,
this curriculum should also include training in trial practice and evidence.
3. Recommendation Three-
Increase the Use ofLaw Clerks and Research Attorneys
to Support Judges
State trial courts in particular should increase their use of law clerks
and research attorneys to provide support to the judges (but not to assume
their decision making responsibilities)." 5 This not only better prepares a
'
8 3 See Rubin, supra note 30, at 653.
14 See Smith, supra note 62.
'
85 Seesupra note 88 and accompanying text (noting how when judges farm out
their decision making duties courts risk becoming perceived as impersonal
institutions).
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judge to hear business cases, but is also likely to result in improved framing
and deciding of issues. This, in turn, should better delineate issues on
appeal.
4. Recommendation Four-
Increase Scrutiny ofFee Applications
Many business disputes involve a written contract. Such contracts
between the parties usually provides that in the event of a dispute between
them, the prevailing party is entitled to recover its "reasonable attorneys'
fees" against the losing party. 186 At least one commentator argues that such
fee shifting has a lottery effect and is akin to an award ofpunitive damages
against the losing party.'87 Regardless of the merits of that debate, the
186 Excellent articles exist with respect to the issue of fee shifting, particularly
those that have modeled fee shifting regimes in an effort to gauge their impact on
litigation and settlement. For a representative sampling, see Symposium, Attorney
Fee Shifting, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (Winter 1984). See also Keith N.
Hylton, Fee Shifting and Predictability ofLaw, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 427,445-47
(1995) (noting that under a two-way fee shifting scheme, there is an incentive to
litigate rather than settle a dispute); Robert S. Miller, Attorneys' Fees for
Contractual Non-Signatories Under Civil Code Section 1717: A Remedy in Search
of a Rationale, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 535, 541 (1995) ("[F]ee-shifting might
discourage settlement. Adding the possibility of recovering fees into the litigants'
calculus of the settlement value of their cases could make settlement less likely.").
But cf John J. Donohue HI, Opting for the British Rule, or IfPosner and Shavell
Can't Remember the Coase Theorem, Who Will?, 104 HARV.L.REV. 1093 (1991);
and Bradley L. Smith, Note, Three Attorney Fee-Shifting Rules and Contingency
Fees: Their Impact on Settlement Incentives, 90 MICH. L. REv. 2154 (1992).
See Bruce L. Hay, Fee Awards and Optimal Deterrence, 71 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 505, 514-15 (1995). Hay further notes that when the prospect of fee shifting
(or punitive damages) exists, attorneys will invest more in the litigation. See id. at
511-13. For possible examples of this concept in action, see Barbara Steuart, No
Joke: $100 Dispute Spawns More Than $1 Million in Fees, RECORDER, Oct. 21,
1994, at 1 (discussing a landlord-tenant dispute over a $100 fee that yielded an
attorneys' fees award of $422,258); Deane Gardenhome Ass'n v. Denktas, 16 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 816, 817, 819 (Ct. App. 4th 1993) (where the monetary value of the
dispute was less than $1800 but the court awarded $15,000 in attorneys' fees to the
prevailing party). Unfortunately, there is little empirical evidence that illustrates the
depth or severity of fee shifting and its impact on settlement and litigation. It has
been the authors' experience in California, however, that many trial judges too
easily rubber stamp the prevailing party's fee application and are reluctant to
disallow any meaningful portion of the requested fees, especially where the client
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important point for purposes of this Article is that many business clients are
concerned about this issue; it is one reason why they perceive the public
court system to be too expensive and unpredictable, and is yet another
reason why some of them are turning to private ADR to revolve their
disputes. Thus, in order to maintain the integrity ofthe public court system
and make it a more attractive forum for businesses seeking to resolve their
disputes, judges at all levels need to be more diligent about scrutinizing fee
applications and ensure that every attorneys' fee award bears a reasonable
relation to the hours, rates, and results of the litigation.18 If the fees sought
are in any way unreasonable, they should be disallowed. 8 9
has paid them.
188 The factors that courts should utilize in determining the amount of a
prevailing party's fees sought pursuant to an attorneys' fees provision in a contract
are well summarized in Rule 1.5(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the
American Bar Association. This rule provides that the factors to be considered in
determining the reasonableness of a fee request include the following:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service
properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the
particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer,
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers
performing the services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(a) (1995). States have a
similar provision in their rules of professional conduct. See, e.g., RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCTOFTHE STATEBAROFCALIFORNIA Rule 4-200 (amended
1992).
"I9 See, e.g., McGinnis v. Kentucky Fried Chicken, 51 F.3d 805, 810 (9th Cir.
1995) ("Lawyers mightreasonably spend $148,000 worth oftimeto win $234,000.
But no reasonable person would pay lawyers $148,000 to win $34,000."). Further,
California's Sixth District Court of Appeal recently decided that all of the fees
incurred aier the plaintiff rejected a reasonable but informal settlement proposal
were not "reasonably spent" on the litigation and were not compensable by the
losing parties. The client had paid more than $450,000 of the billed attorneys fees;
$520,587 was requested, but only $75,000 was awarded. Meister v. Regents of
University of California, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 913, 916-18 (Ct. App. 6th 1998). The
authors submit that more trial courts should follow this example.
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5. Recommendation Five-
Businesses Must Become Informed Consumers ofLegal Services
Businesses must become more informed and more sophisticated
consumers of legal services. The issue of the corporate law firm and its
"discovery lawyers,"'19 coupled with litigation expense that is out of
proportion to amounts in controversy, require businesses to take more
responsibility.19' Stated differently, the decision to use a corporate
megafirm to handle a company's legal work is not always the best
decision.92
'oSee supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
'9' As an example, one of the authors has taught M.B.A. students for a number
of years. The percentage of these students who appear to have little interest in
becoming sophisticated users of legal services is striking. The prevailing attitude
seems to be, "That is something for my in-house counsel to worry about." While
this attitude may be unique to the author's academic institution, we suspect that is
not the case. In short, the corporate managers of today and the future need to take
more responsibility for alleviating some of the criticisms of traditional litigation.
Corporate management should stop pressuring legal counsel to implement overly-
aggressive litigation tactics, they should stop unreasonably refusing to settle a case
or pay ajudgment when their legal counsel advises them to do so, etc. In short, not
all of the blame lies with lawyers, judges and the court system.
In their thought-provoking book, No Contest, Ralph Nader and Wesley Smith
echo these concerns. See NADER & SMrrH, supra note 57, at 238 ("Clients have to
watch out for both overbilling and overlawyering .... The only thing that will slow
down billing abuses is aggressive case management by clients." (quoting John
Toothman, founder of the Devil's Advocate, and James P. Schratz, previously vice
president for major claims at Fireman's Fund Insurance Company)). Id. at 238-39
(listing several practices that management should look for to determine whether
overbilling or overlawyering is occurring). See also id. at 252-54 (discussing
alternative billing arrangements to traditional hourly billing arrangement, such as
flat fee billing and value billing).
"9 In working with in-house counsel, the authors are struck at the manner in
which many of them select outside counsel. The selection of outside counsel is
often based not on who can do the best job at the best price, but on making certain
that in-house counsel is covered in the event things go wrong. In other words,
should something go wrong, it will often be much easier for in-house counsel to
defend his or her decision to use the corporate megafirm to the board of directors
(notwithstanding such a firm's exorbitant legal bills) than a decision to use a
smaller, cheaper and perhaps less well-known law firm.
Again, Nader and Smith voice a similar concern:
People working for corporations become risk averse .... They will do
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B. Course Corrections to Help Increase the Availability and Use of
Decisions
The second thrust of reforms is to ensure that businesses and the public
have the benefit of knowing and being able to use the accumulated
experience and wisdom of courts in prior cases. This aspect gains
importance as the pool of business cases is being reduced or depleted due
to private judging or disposition ofbusiness cases. The current and growing
practices ofvacatur, selective publication, no-citation rules, and depublica-
tion undermine the availability of this accumulated experience. 93 Further,
the very nature of the self-selection process of a court deciding whether a
particular decision or opinion may or should be used for guidance or
precedent in other cases is inherently flawed,"9 and arguably undermines
"the flexibility and power of self-development of the Common Law."'95
1. Recommendation Six-
Provide More Appellate Judges
As earlier noted, workload concerns drive the use of selective
publication.196 Thus, in spite of the political challenges it presents, ifjudges
need more time to engage in traditional judging activities (versus manage-
rialjudging), then additional appellate judges (not parajudicial staff) should
anything to avoid making a decision that might cause them trouble. For
example, I have never seen an [insurance] adjuster called on the carpet for
paying a legal bill-no matter how fraudulent. However, dispute a bill and
there could be trouble when the well-connected lawyer creates a stink [with
upper corporate management] about his integrity being impugned. The
typical adjuster will see this and be intimidated into silence.
NADER & SMITH, supra note 57, at 237-38 (quoting James P. Schratz, previously
vice president for major claims at Fireman's' Fund Insurance Company).
19a See supra notes 92-112 and accompanying text.
"4One of the authors represented a petitioner before the United States Supreme
Court where certiori was granted from a unanimous court of appeals decision
against him, and which was also deemed "not forpublication." The case before the
Supreme Court, which involved the scope of federal jurisdiction under Section 2
of the Constitution, was reversed by a unanimous Supreme Court, leaving the
decision by the court of appeals not to publish its decision as a curious substantive
and procedural anomaly. Indeed, the author who represented the petitioner in the
case, which has since been cited hundreds of times, continues to receive queries
about where other lawyers and scholars can find the court of appeals' opinion.
" F.B. Ames, The History ofAssumpsit, 2 HARV. L. REV. (pt. 2) 53, 69 (1888).196See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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be hired to handle the critical work that judges perform-deliberating
about, deciding, and writing thoughtful appellate decisions.19 7
2. Recommendation Seven-
Permit Citation ofAny Decision by an Appellate Court ofRecord
There must be a change in applicable rules to permit the citation of any
decision by an appellate court of record. This would effectively cause the
publication, official or otherwise, of all decisions of a court and avoid the
court's self-selection of those cases to be published. It would also be
consistent with the traditional common law model. 19 Indeed, in this age of
computers and the Internet, there can be no reasonable objection to the
burden or expense ofmaking available all decisions of our appellate courts.
If anything, the ability to search cases by computer may promote access to
and use of precedent. 19 A related question is the "grandfather clause
issue"--i.e., the extent to which past unpublished decisions shouldbe apart
of this recommendation. The answer will require careful scrutiny and is left
for a later day and subsequent article. At the very least, however, we
recommend that the rule be prospective (i.e., that it apply to all appellate
decisions starting from the date on which this recommendation takes effect
forward).
3. Recommendation Eight-
Bar the Practice ofDepublication
The practice of depublication should be barred in its entirety. If a
judgment is good enough to stand, so should the lower appellate court's
197 For a concurring view, see Carpenter, supra note 98, at 257 (proposing
increasing the number of appellate court judges and decreasing the size of
parajudicial staff).
"' See id. at 240 ("If unpublished opinions are to be treated in the traditional
common law fashion, then they constitute a source of the first rank; that is, binding
authority within the jurisdiction of the deciding court. These unpublished opinions
should be citable if they are binding authority.").
" See id. at 241 (noting that "experiences and advances in technology continue
to challenge [the] position.., that appellate courts should reduce the number of
published opinions" in order to alleviate their workload concerns). Id. at 253 n.41
("The argument that unpublished opinions are difficult to find has lost some force
with the recent proliferation of on-line research services and circuit-specific CD-
ROMS.").
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opinion. If the higher appellate court does not like the lower appellate
court's decision, it has the option of overruling the decision.
IX. CONCLUSION
We end this Article where we began-with a ballad from Karl
Llewellyn. Professor Mary Ann Glendon writes that in the spring of 1961,
Professor Llewellyn sang the following ballad for the last time to his law
students at the University of Chicago:
Some say our Law's in a sony plight, andfolly its fruition.
The answer to that is to set it right, in the Common Law Tradition
Rowdy dowdy doodle-ee-o.200
The purpose of this Article has not been to point out that the courts and our
system for developing commercial precedent are perfect. We know that
they are not. Instead, it has sought to illustrate that in many ways, courts
and the common law have served business well. As we look to the future
of business dispute resolution in the twenty-first century, we would do well
to follow Professor Llewellyn's advice. We submit that in removing the
evolution of a common body of public decisional authority from the courts,
we are depriving businesses-and those governing and advising them-of
the very body of information that might help prevent business disputes in
the first place. This policy is both shortsighted and erroneous. Through the
course corrections proposed in this Article, our courts and the common law
can become more important, attractive, and efficient instruments in
regulating and evolving our business and commercial lives.
"0 GLENON, supra note 1, at 198.
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